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The study of active measures and disinformation in the United
States government and academic circles has been undergoing a resur-
gence unseen since the 1950s and 1960s. 1 This resurgence was
fueled initially by information provided to the US intelligence commu-
nity, and in Congressional testimony, from Soviet and Eastern bloc
defectors who had been involved with disinformation efforts.2
The closed nature of the Soviet political system is such that hard,
detailed information on the current inner workings of their disinfor-
mation effort is difficult to acquire. For this reason, among others,
there is a tendency in Western governments to ignore or disbelieve
that Soviet active measures are officially endorsed, ongoing, and
extensive.
x In 1956, 1960, and 1961, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard
testimony on the Scope of Soviet Activity in the US . The Technique of
Soviet Propa-ganda . Communist Influence on Anti-nuclear Testing , and
Communist Forgeries . Full citations are provided in the government
documents section of the bibliography.
2 Congressional testimony was received in 1959, 1980, 1982, and
1985 on The Kremlin's Espionage and Terror Organizations . Soviet
Covert Action , and Soviet Active Measures . Full citations are provided
in the government documents section of the bibliography.
Prominent defectors include: Ladislav Bittman (Czechoslovakian State
Security, 1968), Arkady Shevchenko (UN Undersecretary General,
1978), and Stanislav Levchenko (KGB, 1979). All of these individuals
have made new careers as consultants and educators in the field of
Soviet active measures.
Soviet active measures follow five basic themes established in the
early days of Bolshevik power consolidation. These themes are as
applicable in the 1980s as they were in the 1920s:
• Influence the policies of the target government.
• Undermine confidence in the target government's leaders and
institutions.
• Disrupt relations between nations.
• Discredit or weaken internal and external opponents of
communism.
• Generate support for Soviet policies and practices.
(Godson, 1986, p. 2).
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to selectively review Soviet active
measures [aktivnyye meropriyatiya) directed towards the United
States and United States foreign policy interests. The hypothesis is
that the Soviet Union regularly disseminates information about the
United States that is deliberately false or misleading in order to shape
the perceptions of others in favor of the Soviet Union, thus furthering
Soviet foreign policy goals.
A second hypothesis is that the United States has historically been
an unwitting partner in the disinformation efforts aimed against it.
This self-deception concerning Soviet foreign policy is due to a com-
bination of widespread unawareness of the utility of disinformation and
a willingness to disbelieve in Soviet ulterior motives. This leads in
turn to political activism by those sympathetic to the Soviet cause.
The ultimate result of political activity by democratic individuals and
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interest groups who unquestioningly accept Soviet propaganda is the
further shaping of perceptions in favor of the Soviet Union.
I intend to examine the vulnerabilities of a democracy to Soviet
initiated disinformation efforts and offer some general proposals for
responses to Soviet disinformation as they impact the direction of US
foreign policy and survival as a democratic nation.
C. SCOPE
In a thesis of this size, it is impossible to present in- -depth cover-
age of the existing literature on Soviet disinformation efforts and the
response and vulnerabilities of the Western democracies. This thesis
is purposefully limited to an examination of the major concepts and
practices of Soviet perceptions management in the political field.
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n. IDEOLOGY. GOALS AND TARGETS
OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Professors Brian Dailey and Patrick Parker have made a useful dis-
tinction in the focus of deception studies based on the area of activity
and associated target of the deception effort (see Table I). According
to this distinction, deceptive activity may be conducted in either the
political arena or the military arena, or in both concurrently.
In the political arena, the primary goal of deception is percep-
tions management. Political deception consists of efforts to influence
the opinions of policy makers, opinion leaders, and the general public
in the West and the Third World. The desired direction of influence is
positively toward the Soviet Union and its policies, negatively toward
the United States and its policies.
The second area of Soviet deception is the intelligence arena.
Intelligence deception is designed to affect an opponent's military
planning and warfighting capability. This type of deception is main-
tained through misdirection of the perceptions, products, and rec-
ommendations of intelligence analysts regarding Soviet intentions and
capabilities in military and political affairs.3
3This thesis will not examine the Soviet practice of maskirovka, i.e.,
military deception. The Western practice most closely related to
maskirovka is the military use of camouflage, cover, and denial. For
further information on this area of deception, see: Notra Trulock III,
"The Role of Deception in Soviet Military Planning," and Richards J.
Heuer, Jr., "Soviet Organization and Doctrine for Strategic Decep-
tion," in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Soviet Strategic Decep-
tion (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1987).
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TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF SOVIET DECEPTION
Perception Management Intelligence Deception
Target: Decision makers, opinion makers,
public, and, to some extent, intelli-
gence analysts
Target: Intelligence analysts
Channels: Public and private statements by
Soviet leaders and negotiators
Channels: Controlled human sources
Articles in authoritative Soviet
journals
Photographic intelligence
Information made available to




Overt propaganda, front groups,
conferences, exchanges, visitors
Telemetry intercept
Covert press placement Other sensors
Forgeries
Agents of influence
Objective: Influence the opinions and policies
of foreign countries by manipulat-
ing their perceptions of Soviet
activities and objectives. This can
be both tactical and strategic in
nature.
Objective: Mislead or distort the
analysts' opinions and
products relating primar-
ily to military affairs, but
also to political and eco-
nomic affairs.
Source: Dailey and Parker, 1987, p. xvii
There is obviously an overlap in the above classification scheme,
for that is the nature of deception— it is not a discrete process.
Particularly in a democracy, the groups affected by deception efforts
exert a reciprocal influence on each other. The analysts are influ-
enced by the policy makers, while the public and opinion leaders
influence the direction of political- and military-related foreign policy.
This fact is not lost on the Soviets. Reciprocal influence is a helpful
13
factor for the Soviet Union in exploiting the vulnerability of the demo-
cratic form of government.
B. DEFINITIONS
The methods most commonly employed in perceptions manage-
ment include active measures, disinformation, forgery, and propa-
ganda. As Table I indicates, these methods may be utilized by Soviet
leaders, their spokesmen, official and nominally unofficial journal or
newspaper releases, and sympathetic or unwitting foreign sources.
Because the term perceptions management covers a broad range of
activities, some working definitions are helpful:
Active measures Covert actions taken against an adversary to
influence that adversary's behavior in a desired
direction or to influence others' views of an
adversary's behavior.
Propaganda Overt information which may be either true or
false but which is designed to change public or
opinion-leader perceptions.
Disinformation Deliberately false or incomplete information
designed to change perceptions and influence
the behavior of decision makers.
Forgery A particular type of disinformation involving dis-
semination of printed documents, photographs,
or broadcast information which appear to origi-
nate from the stated source but which are actu-
ally falsely attributed to that source. May be
intended for public receipt.
Successful deception may be either overt or covert in nature.
Overt means that the perpetrator of the actions taken is openly
acknowledged, while covert means that the perpetrator is hidden.
Among those who deal with propaganda and perceptions management.
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such activities are divided into the categories of white, black, and grey
propaganda. According to the State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research,
White [operations] are openly attributed and refer to acknowledged
government positions, policies, and statements. These include
diplomatic, trade and informational programs. Black operations are
falsely attributed; they may include planting false stories, surfacing
forgeries, and broadcasting radio programs from clandestine trans-
mitters. Grey affairs fall somewhere in between and include the use
of front groups, local communist parties, or media manipulation.
(US Congress, 1985, p. 48)
When considering active measures, the primary point to remem-
ber is that they are most successful when the target remains deceived
about the true goals of the perpetrator.
C. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF DECEPTION
Deception is employed by the Soviet Union for political pur-
poses—to further the accomplishment of Marxist-Leninist ideological
goals. General Secretary Brezhnev noted, "On The 50th Anniversary of
the USSR," that "the class struggle between the two systems ... will
continue. It cannot be otherwise, for the world outlook and class aims
of socialism and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable."
(Lenczowski, 1982, p. 41) As a tenet of their ideology, the Soviets are
against any democratic state. Democratic government is incompatible
with Marxism-Leninism from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union.
1. The Democratic Threat
According to John Lenczowski, former director of Soviet
Affairs for the National Security Council, democratic ideals are the true
source of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States
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(Lenczowski, 1987, p. 58). Democratic government poses a threat to
Soviet security and the leadership positions of those in the Kremlin.
Awareness of government by consent, limitations on the power of gov-
ernment, and belief in unconditional human rights all may give rise to
demands for the same conditions by those under communist rule. As
long as there is at least one democratic power external to the Soviet
Union, communist rule is "threatened." The US is emphasized
because of the central position it occupies as an example of the
longevity and viability of the democratic system of government.
Continued American success in the areas of economics, tech-
nology, and global political influence has caused the Soviets to view the
US as the "Main Enemy" {glavnyy protivnik) and thus the focus for
their deception efforts. The easiest way for communists to counter
the attractions of democracy is to present democracy as a threat or try
to prove that the United States fails to live up to its own ideals. These
two arguments are the key to Soviet perceptions management efforts
aimed at underdeveloped nations and at the Soviet people.
2. Internal Propaganda
The Soviet people are ruled today by leaders who understand
the benefits that arise from totalitarian control. The Party uses Soviet
historical experience and Marxist-Leninist ideology to justify and
reinforce three beliefs about control: (1) the need for the CPSU lead-
ership to maintain a strong authority figure, (2) belief in the
inevitability and correctness of communist expansion as a political
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system, and (3) belief in an external threat to the safety and security of
the Soviet Union. (Chotikul, 1986, pp. 46-50).
To reinforce belief in the goals of the Party, an internal pro-
paganda program is maintained that provides the people each day with
only the information and interpretations which support the behavior
and beliefs desired by the Party. The core affirmations of belief are
that communism is the optimum stage of human development, that
capitalism is inherently regressive and evil, and that the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has an infallible scientific knowledge
of the actions necessary to ensure the triumph of communism over
capitalism.
The continual emphasis in internal communist propaganda on
the capitalist threat serves two purposes. First, it keeps antagonism
high toward the "aggressive" Western nations, and secondly, it rein-
forces dependence upon the Party leaders as the authority figures who
will resist and "ultimately vanquish" the threatening bourgeois forces.
The Soviet Union has an extremely successful record in the
application of internal control over its population. From its inception,
the Soviet Union has been a totalitarian society making decisions
strictly from the top down, with the express goal of furthering, osten-
sibly, the development and expansion of communism. Everything that
the state does, and every action of its citizens, must be directed
toward this effort.
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D. TARGETS AND GOALS OF PERCEPTIONS MANAGEMENT
The external targets of perceptions management are (1) the
United States, (2) other industrialized countries, and (3) the devel-
oping countries of the Third World. The emphasis placed on these
three target areas may change with the circumstances of differing
opportunity or the relative benefit of detente vs. antagonism, but the
order remains the same.
The specific objectives of the Soviet Union in its efforts to influ-
ence the perceptions and behavior of target governments have been
identified as follows:
• To influence both world and American public opinion against US
military, economic, and political programs which are perceived as
threatening Soviet objectives.
• To demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive, colonial-
ist, and imperialist power.
• To isolate the United States from its allies and friends and dis-
credit those that cooperate with it.
• To demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States
are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world.
• To discredit and weaken US intelligence efforts (particularly
those of the CIA) and to expose US intelligence personnel.
• To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet
foreign policy.
• To undermine the political resolve of the United States and other
Western states to protect their interests from Soviet encroach-
ments. (US Congress, 1982, p. 33)
Some of the above objectives are more suited to one target coun-
try over another. The emphasis on imperialism is not of much use in
Europe or Japan but works well in formerly colonized nations. Also,
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the Soviet Union uses different tactics in pursuit of its objectives
depending on the political structure of the target government. In the
case of Third World or allied countries, Soviet deception is often
designed to create the appearance of uninvited US intervention in the
affairs of state. In a democratic government, according to the former
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "Soviet active measures
are [also] designed to magnify and channel the sincere concerns of
non-Communist critics of official Western government policies."
(Eagleburger, 1983, p. 9)
1. Making Active Measures Work
Although the Soviet Union has an extensive network for
developing and implementing active measures, its success depends on
the predispositions of the target audience. Those who are either anti-
Soviet or pro-Soviet are not the primary targets of disinformation.
Those individuals are either too skeptical or already inclined to believe
the Party line. The person of greatest interest to a propagandist is
the one in the vast middle of the political spectrum who is a potential
convert to the cause.
The position of the Soviet Union as a "great power" provides
Soviet spokesmen with increased access to Western communications
channels. Greater Soviet appreciation of the media role in forming
Western opinion has resulted in increased Soviet demands for direct
presentation of their viewpoint to Western audiences. However, for
Soviet officials to be accepted by a large segment of the population as
legitimate spokesmen with a valid message, there has to be a belief in
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their "moral equivalence" when compared with Western spokesmen
(Beichman, 1987, p. 78). This assumed equivalence of communist and
democratic political systems is supposed to come from the common-
ality of professed aims. To those unfamiliar with the actual practices
of communist rulers:
The notion that Communists are somehow engaged in the struggle
between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, workers and employ-
ers, oppressed and oppressors, leads to the persistent notion that
Communism is somehow more democratic and progressive than its
undemocratic [or democratic] rivals. (Kirkpatrick, 1982, p. 132)
A difference of opinion exists among students of active mea-
sures over whether the intention of the initiator is to have the target
audience believe the disinformation to be true or whether the inten-
tion is to have the target believe in the intended message of the dis-
information— that one should be "against US imperialism and for
progress" (Beichman, 1987, p. 80). It may be that "the reason that
false messages have been so impervious to the truth, is that the iden-
tity and the intention of the message sender proves more important to
the recipient than its substance and veracity." (Beichman, 1987, p.
80) Beichman's point, that intention is valued above truth, is well
taken. Disinformation need not be true to be effective, but it must be
plausible enough for its intended message of "Bad US, Good USSR" to
be accepted. Once that mindset is achieved, if it can be reinforced
through multiple exposures to similar messages, the truth of the
information used to convey the message matters not at all. Belief in
the "truth" of disinformation, the underlying message, or both, can be
counted as a propaganda success for the Soviets.
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E. SUMMARY
Active measures campaigns are designed to further the foreign
policy goals of the Soviet Union. The manipulation of information
against an adversary is not unusual in foreign relations or limited to
the Soviet Union. The Soviet practice is especially worthy of atten-
tion, however, because it is systematic, officially viewed as an ideologi-
cal asset, entrenched in the political and military bureaucracy of the
state, and directed primarily against the country which the Soviets
have declared to be their main enemy— the United States.
In addition to previous concentration on the issue of Soviet active
measures by governmental policy makers and intelligence analysts,
research and reporting efforts are expanding into general literature
and the popular press.4 Recognition that disinformation operations
occur in two areas— political and military intelligence related— but
share to some extent the same targets— the public, policy makers, and
intelligence analysts— properly helps to broaden the target audience
for awareness efforts.
As the chief representatives of democratic nations, the United
States people cannot continue to blind themselves to the ongoing ide-
ological battle. The positive result of initiating action favorable to
Soviet foreign policy, through the use of partial truths which subtly
change perceptions, makes disinformation a potentially rewarding
4See for example, Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine . (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1987); Joseph Mauri, "The Great Pretender,*'
Time , v. 128, p. 23, 25 August 1986; Jack Anderson, "Fiction from
the Kremlin," Washington Post , v. 109, p. B7, 29 December 1985.
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enterprise. It is vitally important that the leaders and peoples of the
Western democracies recognize that the struggle for power and influ-
ence does not take place just in the areas of military or economic
strength but is also a battle of belief and behavior. Some argue that
ideology and differences in style between the Soviet and United States
governments do not matter. This is a shortsighted and dangerous
view, neglecting as it does the expressed intentions and history of
communist rule.
During World War II, the US accepted increased military and eco-
nomic responsibilities among the democratic nations. Just as the US
could not avoid involvement in world affairs as a military participant at
the end of WW II, the United States and her allies can not avoid the
ideological conflict poised by the Soviet Union. Communism is an
actively hostile political system, the ideal of which is to subvert
democracy altogether. To increase the odds of the survival of democ-
racy, it is necessary to enter the ideological competition and to do so
with open eyes.
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III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
FOR SOVIET DECEPTION
A. INTRODUCTION
The political structure of the Soviet Union is divided into two
hierarchies, a State system and a Communist Party system. The Party
system is the older and more important of the two, forming the power
base for the Soviet state and providing the principles which direct
state policy. 5 Clews (1964, p. 69) stated that:
To understand the communist political system it is essential to
remember the interlocking role of the Party and State in the coun-
tries where the Party is in power, in the Communist Bloc itself....
Outside the communist world, we are so used to thinking of the
State as something quite divorced from any individual political party
that it is difficult for us to adjust our minds, to a different concept.
All of the basic requirements for the functioning of the state are
directed and endorsed by the Politburo and the Central Committee of
the CPSU. The Secretariat (nominally subordinate to the Central
Committee) is the 11 -member administrative arm of Party leadership,
responsible for fulfillment of Politburo directives on all aspects of state
management. Subsidiary agencies, particularly the Committee for
State Security, the Propaganda Department, and the International
5In explaining how the Party controls Soviet government, Stalin said
in 1927: "the Communist Party strives ... to secure the election to the
principal posts in the government of its own candidates, ... Secondly,
the Party supervises the work of the administration.... It should be
added that not a single important decision is taken by them without
the direction of the Party." Quoted in Communist Perspective: A
Handbook of Communist Doctrinal Statements in the Original Russian
and in English (no publication data available).
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Department, are responsible for day-to-day fulfillment of Politburo
directives relating to perceptions management.
A brief recounting of the connection between the Central
Committee and the spread of communist ideology worldwide will be
helpful in understanding the current organization for perceptions
management.
1. The Relation of the Central Committee to Agitation and
Propaganda
Disinformation efforts in the Soviet government can be traced
back to the training and employment of agitation and propaganda
(agitprop) workers and the use of State Security operatives against the
Russian people and emigre community in the early years of the revolu-
tion. Lenin's view of political activity was that the masses form 90
percent of the population and should be influenced politically by agita-
tor appeals to their emotions. The cadres, or the 10 percent who
form the politically mature population, are to receive propaganda
appeals to the mind and be used as the spokespersons for communist
ideals and programs both at home and abroad.6
During the immediate post-revolutionary period, spokesmen
for the Central Committee were directed through the Department of
Agitation and Propaganda for internal audiences and through the
Communist International (Comintern) for external audiences. The
6In his famous distinction, G. V. Plekhanov stated, "the propagandist
conveys many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator conveys only
one or a few ideas, but to a great mass of people." Great Soviet
Encyclopedia
.
3rd. ed., v. 1, p. 137.
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Comintern existed from 1919 to 1943 to keep communists worldwide
abreast of the foreign policy themes and objectives desired by the
Soviet Union. The Comintern also demanded and received foreign
communist party support for various measures. The primary respon-
sibility of the Propaganda Department (as it is currently known) was to
educate Soviet citizens in Party ideology and to control cultural
creative expression. Although the Comintern was "dissolved" to pla-
cate Allied protests of subversion efforts against their governments, it
was rapidly followed by the Communist Information Bureau (Comin-
form) organization of European communists, which lasted from 1947
to 1956.
Under the direction of the Central Committee, the above
organizations provided for ideological education and control of persons
who were either believers in the communist system or had no means
of escaping it. There was still a need for contact and influence of
other foreigners. In 1943, shortly after the dissolution of the Com-
intern, the Central Committee formed a Foreign Affairs Department to
address this need. According to Schapiro (1976-77, p. 42), the For-
eign Affairs Department was divided in 1957 into three parts:
1) a Department for Relations with Communist and Workers Parties
of Socialist Countries, which controls the bloc; 2) a Department for
Cadres Abroad, closely linked to the KGB, which is responsible for
the instruction of foreign cells of the CPSU, that is to say cells inside
foreign missions [embassies], ... 3) the core and mainspring of the
Foreign Affairs Department, the International Department.
The CPSU Central Committee has been directly involved from
the beginning of the Soviet state with the formulation and
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dissemination of information that selectively expresses the goals and
intentions of the Party. Despite statements to the contrary, however,
the Central Committee no longer has first-line approval authority for
propaganda campaigns. 7 Endorsements of propaganda themes by the
Central Committee occur after the fact of their development, not
before.
B. POLICY SETTING
Tables II and III provide a basic representation of the Party hier-
archy for the development and employment of active measures by the
Soviet Union. The current policy organization for active measures is as
follows:
1. Politburo
The true seat of policy and decision-making power in the
CPSU is the Politburo, a 10-13 member board of Party elites currently
under the direction of General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. West-
ern observers of the Soviet political system believe that
7The Party line concerning the current relationship of the Central
Committee to the propaganda effort was discussed recently in a
publication by the Moscow Institute for Social Science entitled Social
Psychology and Propaganda :
Propaganda planning is a necessary condition of successful
propaganda work. This planning is obligatory at all levels from the
highest central apparatus of the party down to the local cells . . . The
Central Committee of the CPSU determines the basic tasks of party
propaganda: its decisions are directive in their nature.
Quoted in Roy Godson, Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation
Forecast , no. 3, Summer 1986, p. 8.
26
Policy decisions regarding the use of propaganda and covert action
are made at the apex of the Soviet political system, in the Politburo.
The Politburo approves the major themes of Soviet propaganda
campaigns and the means used to implement them. (Congress,
1980, p. 61)
Richards Heuer, a former CIA officer, has noted that "the Politburo
role is not limited to approving deception plans implemented by
others. Rather, official statements by Politburo members themselves
play an important part in achieving Soviet deception goals." (Heuer,
1987, p. 25)
2. Central Committee
The Central Committee is the means by which the Commu-
nist Party maintains the false appearance of democratic rule by the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Membership in the Central Committee
fluctuates between 325 and 350 Party members, with meetings for
Party Congresses held every five years. When the Central Committee
meets, it is more of a policy-endorsing body than a policy-debating
congress in the democratic sense. Central Committee Congress voting
results have invariably followed expected endorsements of platforms
formulated by the exclusive Politburo membership.
C. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Under the administrative control of the Secretariat, are the three
agencies involved in the direct implementation of active measures
campaigns approved by the Politburo: the International Department
(ID), the Propaganda Department (PD), and the Committee for State
Security (KGB). Any of these organizations may submit recommenda-
tions for specific programs to carry out the active measures goals
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Source: Congress. 1982, p. 229; Baron, 1983, pp. 443-451
In 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the
Soviet Union spent more than $3 billion dollars each year for propa-
ganda efforts by the International Department, Service A of the KGB,
media outlets under the control of the Propaganda Department, and in
support of front organizations and agents of influence (Congress, 1980,
p. 60). Recently, Robert Gates, the CIA Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence, stated that the level of support was now in the $3 to $4 billion
range, and the CIA "has seen no evidence that the level of Soviet
activity has lessened in recent years." (Congress, 1985, p. 4)
Although comprehensive figures are closely guarded by the KGB,
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Director Gates went on to estimate personnel allotments for Soviet
deception organizations as follows (Congress, 1985, pp. 4-6):
Service A 700 officers in Moscow and abroad
International Department 150 to 200 officers in Moscow; 25 offi-
cers in Western Europe
Diplomatic Corps Approximately 233 are intelligence
officers
News Agencies 70 to 80 percent are intelligence officers
1. International Department
The traditional responsibility of the International Department
is to maintain liaison with communist parties in power in the Eastern
bloc, Cuba, and China, and with non-ruling communist parties abroad.
The ID supports Soviet primacy among communist parties abroad
through ideological guidance published, for example, in the monthly
journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (World Marxist Review) :
through funding for non-ruling communist parties; and through liaison
with the international departments of other ruling communist parties.
In this respect, the ID evolved from the Comintern and Cominform.
As the "core and mainspring" for foreign affairs, the ID is
"something much more important than a routine department for rela-
tions with [other] communist parties." (Schapiro, 1976-77, p. 43)
The International Department
coordinates and reviews inputs on foreign policy by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB, Ministry of Defense, and
the foreign policy research institutes under the Academy
of Sciences, such as the Institute of the USA and Canada,
and the Institute of World Economics and International
Relations.... The research institutes themselves are also
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tasked regularly to conduct studies for the ID and to dis-
seminate Soviet views the ID wishes known in the West.
(Heuer, 1987, p. 27)
According to defector reports, Cuban and Eastern bloc nation Interna-
tional Departments are responsible for parallel deception measures in
support of Soviet themes and operations. (Bittman, 1972; Golitsyn,
1974)
Through its International Organizations Section, the ID is also
responsible for the coordination and funding of international fronts.
These groups "are more effective than openly pro-Soviet groups
because they can attract members from a broad political spectrum.
"
(State Department, October 1981, p. 2) Front organizations generally
claim to be politically neutral, but their active support for pro-Soviet
foreign policy aims and their discernable alteration of position in
response to changing Soviet pronouncements indicate that they are
committed to the expansion and goals of communism. The increased
use of international front groups and national friendship societies in
support of Soviet policy will be examined in the section on deception
channels.
2. Propaganda Department
As shown in Table III, the Propaganda Department controls
all official sources of communication from the Soviet Union, including
Pravda . the news agencies TASS and Novosti, and Radio Moscow,
among others. In addition to filtering news of Soviet events to the
West, the Propaganda Department controls the way events in foreign
countries are reported to the Soviet people.
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The controlled flow of information into or out of the Soviet
Union is deliberately designed to support the propaganda aims of the
CPSU. The degree of press control in the Soviet Union makes it clear
that the Soviet press does not maintain an adversarial relationship
with the government. The attitude of communist leaders towards
their press organizations is that the press exists to serve the foreign
policy goals and internal ideological interests of the Party. Information
appearing in press outlets is overtly designed to show the USSR in the
best light possible and to show the US and its allies in the worst pos-
sible light.8
According to a CIA spokesman (Congress, 1982, p. 61), the
International Information Department was established in 1978 to
"reorganize the entire foreign propaganda apparatus, improve its
effectiveness and open a new propaganda offensive against the West."
An alternate explanation for the founding of the IID, now the Propa-
ganda Department (PD), has been given by former KGB intelligence
officer Stanislav Levchenko:
While it is true that the IID [PD] has responsibility for improving the
timing, responsiveness, and coordination of the major propaganda
channels of the USSR, this function was seen as necessary for inter-
nal audiences first, and foreign audiences second.... Furthermore,
8According to a 21 Nov 85 Pravda article, propaganda workers must
"Vividly and convincingly display socialism's advantages and true
values, and reveal the exploitative essence of capitalism, with its
unemployment and inflation, with its large illiterate and homeless
population, with its preaching of racism and chauvinism." Quoted in
Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine , p. 412.
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the IID [PD] does not set propaganda themes. This is more the
responsibility of the ID. (Shultz and Godson, 1986, p. 176)9
3. Committee for State Security (KGB)
The primary tasks of the KGB are espionage against foreign
governments, maintenance of internal security, and counterintelli-
gence against foreign efforts to uncover Soviet state secrets. Involve-
ment in covert deception activity, i.e., active measures, serves to sup-
port those primary tasks.
In 1959, active measures were conducted by the newly
formed Department D (for dezinformatsiya or disinformation). Soviet
bloc intelligence agencies were also required to establish parallel
organizations within their state security forces. For the first time,
disinformation became a long-range policy requiring the cooperation
of all governmental agencies and Soviet intellectuals (Golitsyn, 1984,
p. 49). By 1964, the reach of Soviet intelligence expanded greatly
through the formation of an "integrated intelligence system" which
gave the USSR direct control of bloc disinformation activities. (Sejna,
1986, p. 76)
After undergoing a name change and elevation in status from
the department level, Service A {aktivnyye meropriyatiya or active
measures) was unveiled in 1970. The steady increase in bureaucratic
standing of the active measures organization within the KGB provides a
9Additional support for the seniority of the ID over the IID is provided
by a 14 June 1981 speech to the Central Committee by Konstantin
Chemenko in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, 15 June 1983, v. Ill,
p. R15.
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clear indication of the value of the operations it conducts (Shultz and
Godson, 1986, p. 37). 10
As Table III indicates, Service A of the KGB First Chief Direc-
torate (FCD) is primarily responsible for the implementation of covert
active measures programs decided upon by the Politburo. For the
purpose of conducting deception operations, the KGB
has its own facilities for production of forgeries, fabrications, and
literature of disguised origin. An entire section of the Novosti press
agency is reserved for the Service's personnel, and the Academy of
Sciences accommodates a goodly number of them in its humanities
divisions. (Barron, 1983, p. 447)
When the KGB wants to infiltrate an organization requiring
specific skills— such as a newspaper or a religious group— the KGB will
either provide an agent with training or make use of a person in the
organization who can function as an agent of influence (Shultz and
Godson, 1986, p. 162). Agents of influence are individuals with credi-
bility and access to target groups who (1) may not be aware that they
are being used to support a pro-Soviet position or (2) consciously use
their influence to assist the policy goals of the Soviet Union. The ben-
efit of using the agent of influence is that this person's political activity
"promote[s] the objectives of a foreign power in ways unattributable to
10An additional indicator is provided by Congressional testimony on
the growth of Service A. In 1970, Service A had 40-50 officers, but in
1980 the estimated figure was 200. (US Congress, Soviet Covert
Action . 1980, p. 10)
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that power," providing he does his job well. (Shultz and Godson,
1986, p. 19U) 11
The actual work of spreading disinformation is accomplished
by the Active Measures officer assigned to a particular foreign embassy.
The Active Measures officer is generally a senior individual who can
assign other KGB officers and their agents to a particular disinforma-
tion operation. The assistance of the local communist group and/or
front organization is available and has usually been coordinated through
the International Department (Barron, 1983, p. 447).
The second major element in KGB implementation of active
measures directives is Departments 1 1 and 12 of the First Chief
Directorate. These departments are used for the channeling of disin-
formation and propaganda rather than espionage. Department 12 offi-
cers work undercover within Soviet government institutions as
journalists, academicians, trade union personnel, or ordinary tourists.
Their role is to act as spokespersons for Soviet foreign policy goals
with those whom they contact as "peers," gather intelligence useful to
the government, and be on the lookout for foreigners who may be can-
didates for positions as agents of influence. Department 1 1 officers
are responsible for the supervision of Eastern bloc intelligence service
active measures operations. (Barron, 1983, pp. 449-450)
1 interesting details on the management of agents of influence may be
found in Ladislav Bittman's The Deception Game (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972); and the Levchenko
and Bittman interviews in Dezinformatsia . 1986, pp. 160-181.
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The third major element in KGB active measures operations
is the Second Chief Directorate (SCD). Although this large Directorate
provides the operatives who act as the internal political police, the
SCD also fulfills other roles. Operatives of the Second Chief Direc-
torate are responsible for (1) monitoring the daily activities of foreign
journalists and recruiting them to the Soviet cause, (2) working to co-
opt foreign diplomatic personnel, (3) supervising the management of
tourists visiting the Soviet Union, and (4) determining which Soviet
citizens may travel abroad. Through close contacts with foreigners
visiting the USSR and restrictions on which Soviets foreigners may
meet in their own countries, the SCD plays a central role in affecting
foreign perceptions of the Soviet Union.
4. Changes to the Propaganda Team
In the fall of 1985, the Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council stated that:
The Gorbachev regime plainly is more astute than its predecessors
in manipulating public perceptions. In their public dealings, both
Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have already demon-
strated a sophisticated understanding of how to use the Western
media. Moreover Gorbachev seems to be preparing to revamp the
Soviet propaganda apparatus. (Congress, 1985, p. 7)
Although the general outlines of the Soviet propaganda appa-
ratus have not changed, there have been some important changes in
personnel and technique. These changes are the most far-reaching
since the 1978 improvements that ushered in the International
Information Department.
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During the March 1986 27th Party Congress, General Secre-
tary Gorbachev announced the replacement of Leonid Zamyatin as
Chief of the IID [PD], by Aleksandr Yakovlev, and the renaming of that
organization as the Propaganda Department. This change seems to
have taken place in July 1985. Yakovlev concurrently became the
Party Secretary for internal and external propaganda (Counterpoint ,
v. 2, no.l, p. 2). In June 1986, Yakovlev was promoted to full-fledged
membership in the Politburo and relinquished his oversight of day -to-
day Propaganda Department operations to Yuri Sklyarov, former editor
of the World Marxist Review (Counterpoint , v. 2, no. 5, p. 1). Yakovlev
has ten years' experience living in the West, which should be benefi-
cial in his supervision of media outlets for Soviet propaganda.
The other organization to undergo a major change in leader-
ship near the time of the March 1986 Party Congress was the Interna-
tional Department. Anatoly Dobrynin became head of the ID after the
retirement in February 1986 of Boris Ponomarev. Ponomarev had run
the International Department for 30 years.
Dobrynin is believed to be the guiding force behind the mod-
ernization of ID/PD/Foreign Ministry cooperation in propaganda
efforts and has a great deal of experience in recommending successful
disinformation themes to the Kremlin (Counterpoint , v. 2, no. 4, p. 6).
A former Soviet Ambassador to the United States for 24 years,
Dobrynin is the one senior Soviet official with hands-on experience of
American culture. His experience is especially valuable in the areas of
democratic press and political systems. In the words of Kathleen
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Bailey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Active Measures Analy-
sis, "any time you know how a machine works, you can tinker with it."
(Bering-Jensen, 1986, p. 27)
The reorganization of the Propaganda Department and the
International Department at the top leadership level has had reper-
cussions throughout the Soviet print, publishing, and broadcast media.
Soviet spokesmen no longer have the boorish appearance and manners
of the 1960s but could pass for suave Europeans or Wall Street execu-
tives. The Soviets are also changing their propaganda tactics, placing
more emphasis on person-to-person exchanges with influential West-
erners and their Soviet counterparts. The emphasis is on presenting
an image to the world of a modern and moderate power which is open
to criticism from its intelligentsia, non-dogmatic, and only interested
in peaceful coexistence with its neighbors in a nuclear-free world.
D. SUMMARY
All available evidence indicates that the Soviet practice of percep-
tions management is an endemic policy that crosses the boundaries
(in the Western viewpoint) of State and Party, security organizations,
and institutions of foreign policy. As Kennan observed years ago,
communism is a political system that requires a monolithic govern-
ment, a government that will accept no other organization besides its
own. Whatever the course decided by Party elites, the State must fol-
low. Under a communist system, the State exists only to support and
advance the Party. The government of the USSR and the CPSU are
one and the same.
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As the bureaucratic structure of the CPSU expanded, the leader-
ship structure of a small group of supporters gathered around a central
authority figure became insufficient. It became necessary to create a
network of organizations, each fulfilling a particular role. Internally,
the International Department, Propaganda Department, and KGB all
serve to reinforce the centralized system of authority, educate the
people in communist ideology, and monitor their compliance with
Party rules. Externally, they serve as a means to engage in ideological
and intelligence warfare with the West.
Perceptions management has been referred to as "psychological
war waged against the free world by the Soviet Union and its allies."
(Casey, 1985, p. 1) Keeping in mind that successful perceptions man-
agement activities are designed to hide the perpetrator's intentions
from the target, the majority of methods used in deception do not
appear related to warfare at all. The realization that war has been
declared, for all practical purposes, only comes when the historical
statements and actions of the Soviet Union are examined in light of
their intentions and successes in replacing democratic systems of
government with communist ones. As long as the cornerstone of
communist aggression is an antagonism toward democracy, and as
long as the Soviet perception is that they are the injured party rather
than the aggressor, efforts to manipulate Western perceptions toward
a favorable outlook on the Soviet Union and its policies will not cease.
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IV. DECEPTION CHANNELS. THEMES. AND CAMPAIGNS
A. DECEPTION CHANNELS
Successful deception requires more than the public and private
statements of Soviet spokesmen or official announcements in govern-
ment publications. In order to positively influence the perceptions of
others about the Soviet Union and generate negative perceptions about
the United States, other deception channels are utilized to spread the
particular message selected in Moscow. Deception channels may be
information sources, organizations, or individuals, some clearly under
Politburo direction, and some less obviously influenced by the
Politburo.
In general, each deception operation involves individuals or orga-
nizations fulfilling three separate roles:
The Operator— author and conductor of an operation; The Adver-
sary— this can be a foreign state as a whole, its ruling authorities, or
even individual citizens.... The Unwitting Agent— a game player who
without being aware of his true role, is exploited by the Operator as
a means of attacking the Adversary. (Bittman, 1981, p. 215)
During the course of exchanges between the Operator and the
Adversary, there is an audience of onlookers. It is important to realize
that these onlookers are also targets of active measures. The intent of
the Operator is for these target onlookers to form negative percep-
tions of the Adversary, either because of the content of the Operator's
message or because of the response of the Adversary in efforts to
defend his position. This paradigm works in cases where exchanges
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occur directly between the Soviet Union and the United States, but
the pattern also holds when the disinformation is not delivered to an
American audience but is intended for US allies or a Third World
audience. In this case, the real or imagined actions of the Adversary
form the subject matter of the disinformation.
One of the most profitable ways for the Soviet Union to increase
the number of "Unwitting Agents" available to meet its objectives is
through the use of channels known as front organizations.
1. Front Organizations
The history of front organizations predates World War II,
beginning in 1921 with a group known as International Worker's Aid.
The founder of this group was Willi Munzenberg, the principal orga-
nizer of early Soviet efforts to gain sympathetic audiences of "fellow
travellers" who would spread pro-communist propaganda. 12
Worker's Aid was able to mobilize people and money among
humanitarians of varied political hues. It was a gigantic fund-raising
operation that utilized many methods that have, since then, become
widely accepted. Munzenberg pioneered the use of prominent per-
sonalities, artists, and writers in mass meetings and appeals....
Worker's Aid was able to function where the Comintern was under
suspicion, and where Communist parties were therefore suspect or
illegal. (Ebon, 1987, pp. 57-59)
12 According to the State Department,
In Leninist theory and practice, front organizations are
"transmission belts" whereby elements of the program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) are presented to non-
communists who may already sympathize with or support similar
policies, but who are unwilling to accept the entire program of the
CPSU or submit to party discipline. (US Department of State,
Foreign Affairs Note . July 1984, p. 1)
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After WW II, front organizations became more professional,
learned to utilize mass communication, and made use of the post-war
euphoria and strengthening Soviet political position to establish
friendship societies. The general pattern was to establish a group that
was proclaimed to be non-partisan but which over time came to be
more and more directed by a communist leadership. 13 In some cases,
this resulted in a split among the membership, with some individuals
forming organizations of their own to address the original concerns of
the group without Soviet influence. (Clews, 1964, pp. 96-98)
Some of the more well-known and active front organizations
are the World Peace Council (1949), World Federation of Trade Unions
(1945), World Federation of Democratic Youth (1945), Afro-Asian Peo-
ple's Solidarity Organization (1957), and Christian Peace Conference
(1958) (Rose, 1985, pp. 52-55). Table IV lists other organizations
functioning as communist fronts, such as special organizations for
women, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and journalists. No stone is left
unturned in the search for a sympathetic and malleable audience.
Because the Soviet practice is to exploit any discontent or
cause for protest among the "masses" (at all socioeconomic and
13 In December 1960, the CPSU issued a New World Plan in which
cooperation with non-communist groups was addressed in this way:
While ensuring that the communists retain the leadership at all
times, greater use is to be made of the peace movements, the youth,
student and trade union groups and women's groups to exploit all
possible sources of discontent, joining forces where possible with
social democratic and labour groups for tactical ends. (Clews, 1964,
p. 60)
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educational levels), a group may engage in activism which benefits the
Soviet cause without being a front organization per se. According to
former KGB agent Stanislav Levchenko,
The trick is to make people support Soviet policy unwittingly by
convincing them they are supporting something else. Almost every-
body wants peace and fears war. [The Soviet message is] that what-
ever America does endangers peace and that whatever the Soviet
Union does furthers peace. (Barron, 1982, p. 4)
Front organizations may be divided into two categories: (1)
long-standing international front organizations with affiliates in various
countries, and (2) smaller national organizations which tend to be
based on the model of friendship societies (Clews, 1964, p. 95). The
"platform" of front organizations may be designed around any issue of
interest to a particular group, but certain themes have predominated
over the years.
The current principal themes of Soviet front organizations
are peace, nuclear disarmament, demilitarization of space, national
liberation, and friendship. The problem with espousal of these themes
by front organizations is not that the proposed actions are necessarily
bad but that the demands for action (generally immediate) are all
directed toward the West, to the exclusion of bilateral action on the
part of the Soviets. 14 Front organizations also deliberately ignore, or
14According to Ebon, To be for peace, in terms of Soviet propaganda
efforts, has always meant to be against something, usually an under-
taking, a project, or a policy of the United States, often merely identi-
fied as "the imperialists" (which could include the NATO countries or
other nations)." (Ebon, 1987, p. 78).
43
deny the harm of, Soviet actions that play a major role in preventing
genuine attainment of positive goals in international relations.
The only way to determine whether a particular organization
is a front group is through observation of its actions, particularly in
response to changing Soviet foreign policy interests. One-sided
attacks against the foreign policy of Western nations, changes in pro-
nouncements or programs that parallel those of the Soviet Union,
investigation of funding sources (perhaps via the local Party), and the
presence of communist members on the governing bodies of their
boards are all indicators of a front organization. With the exception of
the first two conditions (one-sided attacks or pronouncement
changes), the relevant information is generally well hidden or
denied. 15
a. World Peace Council
The World Peace Council (WPC) became known by its
current name in 1950. It was preceded by the World Congress of
Intellectuals for Peace in 1948 and the World Committee of Partisans
for Peace in 1949. Headquarters of the WPC have variously been in
Paris (1949-51), Prague (1951-53), and Vienna (1954-57), but, due to
expulsion from those cities for actions against their governments, the
WPC has been headquartered in Helsinki since September 1986. 16
15For further information on fronts, see Clive Rose, Campaigns Against
Western Defense . 1985; John C. Clews, Communist Propaganda Tech-
niques . 1964; and James L. Tyson, Target America . 1 98 1
.
16For an 11 -year interim period, the WPC went undercover in Vienna
as the International Institute for Peace.
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The WPC has affiliates in 142 countries, publishes the Peace Courier
and Disarmament Forum on a monthly basis, and conducts World
Peace Assemblies generally on a three-year schedule. (State Depart-
ment, April 1985, p. 2)
TABLE IV
TEN MAJOR SOVIET INTERNATIONAL FRONTS
Front Founded Headquarters Affiliates
World Peace Council (WPC) 1950 Helsinki 142
Christian Peace
Conference (CPC) 1958 Prague 86
World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU) 1945 Prague 90
Women's International
Democratic Federation (WIDF) 1945 East Berlin 129
International Association of
Democratic Lawyers (IADL) 1946 Brussels 64
International Organization
of Journalists (IOJ) 1946 Prague 114
Afro-Asian Peoples'
Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) 1957 Cairo 91
International Union of
Students (IUS) 1946 Prague 118
World Federation of
Scientific Workers (WFSW) 1946 London 33
World Federation of
Democratic Youth (WFDY) 1945 Budapest 210
Source: (State Department, August 1983, pp. 3-41; Spaulding, March-
April 1986, p. 73)
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As the premier front organization of the Soviet Union, the WPC
has been instrumental in sponsorship of disarmament-related activity
such as the Stockholm Appeal of March 1950, which demanded a ban
on nuclear weapons, and a follow-up in June 1975, urging
continuation of detente and an end to the arms race (Rose, 1985, p.
250). Additionally, the WPC has sponsored conferences on European
security via the International Committee for European Security and
Cooperation, organized activity against US involvement in Vietnam,
supported protests against the neutron bomb and for a nuclear freeze,
and is currently active in protests against the "militarization of space."
(State Department, April 1985, pp. 4-5)
Soviet control of the WPC has occasionally caused dissent
within the ranks, especially among the representatives of Eastern bloc
countries and the membership truly committed to bilateral efforts for
peace and human rights. 17 Internal protest against the Soviet invasion
of Hungary in 1956 resulted in replacement of some senior members
of the WPC Presidential Board, and the 1969 Assembly in East Berlin
was the occasion of protests against tight delegate and press control.
Delegate demands that "the Soviet Government grant amnesty to
17Noncommunist peace groups, such as the Bertrand Russell Founda-
tion, are heavily criticized by Soviet officials for attempts to remain
nonpartisan and contact Soviet citizens who wish to do so also. In
1983, the editor-in-chief of Pravda stated that the Soviet Union had no
such thing as an "independent peace movement," and that those who
claimed to be independent were trying to "assert their private, per-
sonal interests, and ... are abusing the emotions for peace, the longing
for peace." (US Department of State, Foreign Affairs Note . April 1986,
p. 6)
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political prisoners, and ... bring to light those forms of repression
practiced in the U.S.S.R." were met with derision by the pro-Soviet
leadership of the WPC (State Department April 1985, p. 2). As a
result, the World Peace Council has lost much of its status as a guiding
light among peace groups. What makes this less of an occasion for
complacency is the fact that the WPC has spawned a number of
subsidiary peace organizations. These subsidiaries do not have readily
apparent ties to the Soviet Union and continue to attract new
members.
The most recent WPC Assembly took place October 15-
19, 1986, in Copenhagen, Denmark. This assembly was the first held
outside a communist country since 1965 and was not a successful
forum. Although the WPC is recognized by the UN, the Secretary Gen-
eral declined an invitation to speak at the Assembly opening cere-
mony. Social Democrats in Denmark largely boycotted the event, the
opening ceremony was marred by protesters who displayed signs
calling it a "KGB Peace Congress," and protesters demanded to
address Soviet actions such as the Afghanistan invasion and Soviet fail-
ure to live up to the 1975 Helsinki Accords. (Counterpoint , v. 2, no. 8,
January 1987)
Permission to attend the 1986 WPC Assembly was tightly
controlled and resulted in the expected endorsements of Soviet aims
such as "abolition of military blocs like NATO, the removal of US bases
from Europe, and support for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua."
(Counterpoint , v. 2, no. 8, January 1987, p. 4) The success of
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protesters in taking over the podium on the final day led to an early
closing of the assembly without a final official statement being made.
The majority of the newsworthy action surrounding this fourteenth
World Peace Congress Assembly occurred outside of the conference
hall. The previously unquestioning supporters for Soviet propaganda
are beginning to find their own voices.
2. Friendship Societies and Concerned Citizens
One of the elements of professionalism which the Kremlin
has introduced into its active measures campaigns is the use of
"concerned Soviet citizens" available and eager to discuss the folly of
United States policy with their peers in the West. While these citizens
are supposedly relating their own private points of view, they are
directed by the International Department toward a variety of influen-
tial groups and professional associations. The initial contact is usually
a sophisticated professional effort, offering the opportunity for "open"
discussions which develop into attacks on US policy with little to no
criticism of the policies of the Soviet Union. (Counterpoint , v. 2, no.
6, November 1986)
Friendship societies differ from international front organiza-
tions in that they have a more localized orientation, stressing "people-
to-people" contacts and avoidance of "political" discussions for an
emphasis on day-to-day concerns. The effort in this case is intended
to strengthen the perception of the ability of ordinary citizens to tran-
scend the bureaucratic limitations of their governments and reach
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personal understandings that will eventually be reflected in friendlier
exchanges between the Soviet Union and the West.
The use of ostensibly "private citizens" as spokespersons
gives Moscow increased access to a broad range of social groups. Local
governments, religious groups, independent peace activists, and emi-
gre groups are all targets for what has been referred to as "the new
detente." The benefit to Moscow is that "once organizations or indi-
viduals become involved in 'bridgebuilding,' breaking down
'stereotypes,' 'preventing wars,' and so on, it becomes more difficult
to criticize the Soviet bloc." (Godson, 1987, p. 14) If contact can be
made with individuals who have the basis for a common interest,
removed on the surface from politics, then the door is open for more
formalized relations. Relations which are intended to be favorable for
Moscow at the expense of Washington.
The belief— correct though it is— that the arts, the environ-
ment, and athletics are areas of common interest to all people
regardless of political affiliation is handily used by the Soviet Union to
expand its influence among people who want to do their share in
improving relations between the superpowers. 18 What the average
18An interesting lesson may be learned from one independent effort to
make contact on the local level without prior coordination via Soviet
representatives: A peace group in Maryland requested sister-city sta-
tus with a town in Latvia, sending official greetings and personal good
wishes, only to hear no response for two years. Finally, the group was
told that they had erred in their request because their town was too
small and they had failed to make their request through Soviet
authorities outside the local Latvian bureaucracy. Questioning the
delay and the apparent lack of interest in friendly relations, a little
research turned up a more probable reason for the refusal of a sister
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Western participant rarely realizes, however, is that there can be no
such thing as an "ordinary" Soviet citizen allowed to visit a democratic
country. The Soviet representatives met by Western citizens have
been thoroughly screened by the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB:
The 11th Department approves and regulates the travel abroad of all
Soviet citizens, except senior Party members and persons in sensi-
tive positions. It scrutinizes the background and circumstances of
each prospective voyager ... Ordinarily, either a staff officer or a part-
time agent of the Department accompanies each departing group.
His reports on the behavior of the travelers become a permanent
part of the dossiers kept on every Soviet citizen who ever has been
abroad. (Barron, 1974, p. 82)
The fundamental error of Western belief in the utility of
exchanges between what are represented as two groups of concerned
citizens is that only the citizens of the Western nations play a role in
the determination of state policy. Free elections do not exist in the
Soviet Union, and citizens who openly disagree with CPSU policy are
persecuted as state enemies. Satellite television links and cultural
exchanges may increase understanding of a different cultural and
political system, but they are insufficient to effect change in a political
system that does not allow the impetus for political change to flow
from the public to the politicians.
3. Soviet and Western Media
Although General Secretary Gorbachev has accused the West
of unleashing "psychological warfare ... a special form of aggression; of
Continued from previous page
city relationship— the "claim to fame" of Rezekne, Latvia, is the local
KGB prison camp. (Counterpoint , v. 2, no. 10, March 1987, p. 2)
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information imperialism" (Shevchenko, 1986, p. 3), he requires from
communist cadres
a devoted Party attitude, a consistent class approach to assessing
current events and phenomena, political vigilance, intolerance of
views that are alien to us. (Shevchenko, 1986, p. 8)
This duality of approaches is characteristic of the Soviet world view
and is a primary factor in the success of the International and Propa-
ganda Departments in spreading the Soviet view around the world.
The international news media is one of the most useful chan-
nels available to the Soviets for disinformation purposes. In order to
conduct successful propaganda, the Kremlin relies not just on Soviet
reporters but on foreign journalists as well. On one level, Soviet media
disinformation is conducted by Soviet correspondents based overseas,
by radio broadcasts originating from the Soviet Union or satellite
countries, and by official print media originating in Moscow. On
another level, Soviet disinformation depends greatly upon the
information provided to foreign journalists in Moscow, "clandestine
placement of a media item in a foreign news outlet, or the selective
replay of an article which originally appeared in a foreign publication."
(Shultz and Godson, 1986, p. 35)
a. Soviet Journalism19
When considering disinformation that originates from
official Soviet sources, it is crucial that Western audiences realize that
19From the vantage point of American experience, journalism does not
exist in the Soviet Union. The term is used throughout for the sake of
convenience.
51
Soviet journalists are restricted to providing only news which has been
approved by the Party. 20 The state censorship bureau (Glavlit) must
approve the text of every Soviet news story, radio program, or televi-
sion program (even those obtained via exchange with the West), and
monitors journalistic output to insure that no changes are made. 2 l
Glasnost does not extend to deviations from the officially provided
news viewpoint. Nicholas Daniloff has reported that:
nothing suggests rapid lifting of the Kremlin's historic control of the
message. The more sophisticated theme may no longer be that
Soviet Society is perfect and that of the West uniformly evil.... But
the changes are for perfection of the state system, not concessions
to the West. (Daniloff and Trimble, 1986, p. 36)
Many Western observers have noted that, within the past
four years, the appearance and behavior of Soviet spokesmen reflect a
decreased Soviet emphasis on ideological rhetoric and an unveiling of
20An additional role of the Soviet "journalist" may be as an agent or
cooptee of the KGB. This role is discussed in Chapter III, by Barron
(1983), and by Levchenko in Shultz and Godson (1986), among other
sources.
21 In 1983, a Soviet announcer was removed from his position with
Radio Moscow and sent to a psychiatric clinic for using the following
phrases in his reporting:
The Soviet Union has said once again that it is not prepared to work
to secure constructive decisions on limiting nuclear arms in Europe
... the Soviet Union wishes to have more missiles and warheads ...
than NATO has.... the struggle against the Soviet invaders ... antigov-
ernment activity carried out from the Soviet territory endangers the
security of the population of Afghanistan.
According to a spokesman from Radio Moscow, his reinstatement to a
nonbroadcast editorial position occurred because, "He was ill, but now
he has been cured." (Ebon, 1987, pp. 282-284)
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spokesmen who look and sound more Western. David Powell, a Soviet
specialist on the Party media, says that today's spokesmen are "much
more nearly what Americans are accustomed to, and what Americans
readily identify with." (Dailey, 1987, p. 419) According to defectors
(Bittman, Shuman, Senja) who have experience in disinformation pol-
icy and practices, the intent of this change is "to sell a suave, 'liberal'
Gorbachev image to the U.S. public and to the NATO allies." (Gulick,
1986, p. 72) Should this method of positively influencing perceptions
about the USSR prove unsuccessful, more traditional methods are
available.
b. Soviet Manipulation of Western Journalism
One of the reasons for the ease with which the CPSU
manipulates Western perceptions about the Soviet Union is strict con-
trol of access to information by foreigners. Journalists are often not
bilingual and so must depend on Soviet-provided translators or press
releases. Audiences with Soviet officials in Moscow occur on an
invitation-only basis and are highly sought after. Reporters who probe
too deeply may find themselves shut out of the information chain or
detained and then expelled from the country (Brock, 1986). When a
journalist enters the Soviet Union, he or she is there by permission
and must play the information game to a large extent by Soviet rules.
Television may be considered the media of choice among
Americans, and is popular among developed nations in general, but the
traditional vehicles for Soviet propaganda have thus far remained print
media and radio broadcasts. This is especially true for propaganda
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directed toward Europe and the Third World. Radio broadcasts to
developing countries are a wonderful disinformation tool because
there is generally no way for the listener to check the veracity of the
information. Moscow often disguises its broadcasts as "organs of
authentic local 'progressive' forces," with messages designed to meet
its own ends. (US State Department, 1981, p. 2)
The most widely studied form of Soviet media manipula-
tion is the printed forgery. Forgeries generally have certain charac-
teristics in common: "anonymous surfacing, technical and linguistic
aberrations, news value and timeliness, and contribution to Soviet
policy and propaganda goals." (US State Department, April 1983, p.
2) The CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence has explained that, "while
efforts are first made to surface forgeries in the establishment Euro-
pean press to give them greater credibility, they often end up first
either in the Third World or leftist European press." (US Congress,
1985, p. 13)
The lasting benefit of a forgery is that it may be used over
and over again, because "once published it assumes a credibility of its
own." (US State Department, April 1983, p. 2) After being surfaced by
a friendly journalist, the news item may be picked up by a more influ-
ential paper, giving the USSR the chance to reference and redistribute
the item as originating in the West. This ruse can be made to work
even if the second mention of the forgery was a refutation. If the Sovi-
ets are able to surface a forgery in noncommunist media, "this
enhances the credibility of the disinformation operation and provides
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more believable sourcing for replay by communist media." (US State
Department, May 1984, p. 3)
The demands of their profession make journalists partic-
ularly susceptible to Soviet control of their information sources and
the attraction of readily provided "news" in the form of a forgery. In
the modern world, information is equated with power and journalists
are power brokers. Despite the power of journalists as opinion lead-
ers, disinformation planted in the Third World or the West would have
little power to alter public and policy-maker opinion if the themes
used by the Soviets did not strike a responsive chord among the
audience.
B. DECEPTION THEMES
The specific objectives of Soviet perceptions management listed
in Table I are impossible to reach without well-developed themes
which can be transmitted for consumption in the West. Active mea-
sures themes may be transmitted overtly by numerous individuals,
ranging from front organization spokesmen, to Soviet journalists and
academicians, to Soviet political leaders themselves. What advances
the positive perception of Soviet goals most, however, is when the
"facts" of disinformation themes become "common knowledge"
among the groups to whom various ideas are targeted. As the Soviet
Union successfully alters the perceptions of what is proper or what is
true among the peoples of the world, it will matter less and less to
those who are unaware what the true facts actually are.
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The themes of Soviet propaganda are designed to affect two dif-
ferent areas of perception among the target audience. First targeted is
the perception of the intent of Soviet foreign policy. The second tar-
get is world perception of the foreign policy intentions of the Western
democracies, particularly the United States. The following are
submitted as the most important and misleading themes underlying
Soviet deception efforts.
1. Evolution of the Soviet State
According to Lenczowski, the "principal theme of Soviet
strategic deception is to convince the West that the Soviet Union is
not Communist any more." (Lenczowski, 1987, p. 57) It is in the best
interests of the Soviet Union not to appear to the West as a threat,
therefore possibly facing increased political and military resistance to
its foreign policy practices. The leaders of the Kremlin would rather
be seen as a modern nation, a partner superpower with the United
States, that by right influences world events in equal measure. The
first step in the effort to convince the democratic governments of
Soviet evolution is to blind those governments to the role of commu-
nist ideology in Soviet foreign policy.
a. Communist Ideology Does Not Determine Soviet
Behavior
If the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is no longer
directed by Marxist-Leninist ideology, then certain conclusions follow.
The first conclusion Soviet propagandists want democratic peoples to
reach is that communist ideology does not determine Soviet behavior.
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The West should believe that the Soviets have no intention of spread-
ing communism throughout the world, the Soviet Union does not
orchestrate the actions of the Eastern bloc and Cuba, and the Soviets
would be willing to settle for a division of the world into US-led and
Soviet-led spheres of political influence. Basic knowledge of the
communist political program would identify these "conclusions" as
false. The coexistence of democracy with communism does not meet
the ideal world view of Marx, Lenin, or the current occupants of the
Politburo. Temporary adjustments to the reality of such coexistence
may be made, and may even be proposed as good public relations, but
the thrust of the Soviet political evolution is for worldwide socialism
under strong Kremlin leadership.
An additional benefit for the Soviet Union, if political
ideology is no longer the reason for poor US-Soviet relations, is the
opportunity to create a different reason for poor relations. The Soviets
would have the West believe that the US-Soviet conflict is based on
differing economic systems or standard state territorial politics. The
intentions are (1) to foster belief in an equal measure of guilt for nega-
tive consequences to others as both countries try to extend their
influence; (2) create a view of both sides as symmetrical (in modern
parlance: "The Russians are just like us."); and (3) to make the rest of
the world's countries believe that they can remain neutral in the
superpower conflict.
In actuality, the major conflict is between democratic
goals of freedom and the communist practice of dictatorship. The
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US/Soviet conflict is not exclusively between economic systems,
because Eastern bloc deviation from the Soviet program is more read-
ily tolerated when the deviation is economic than under any other cir-
cumstance. Additionally, the Soviet Union is able to incorporate
capitalistic practices or seek to benefit from capitalism when such
actions will be beneficial. The Soviet Union seeks to increase its eco-
nomic influence as much as the US does— the economic systems just
happen to be different.
Lastly, standard territorial acquisition for security is not
the issue, because the Soviets have never been satisfied with their
borders as they are, either under monarchy or communism. (Labin,
1960, p. 23)
b. Moderates vs. Conservatives in the Kremlin
The second conclusion disinformation channels provide
in the "evolving Soviets" theme is that Kremlin leaders must face the
same political infighting that characterizes the policy-making process
of the United States and Europe.22 If Kremlin leadership is composed
of moderates who want to take a "live and let live" position with the
West and conservatives who would rather continue to strive for com-
munist political and military dominance, then the West is "obliged" by
morality and good sense to continually make appeasing overtures
toward the moderate faction.
22This particular argument is believed by some to have been first sug-
gested to the Kremlin by then-Ambassador Dobrynin in concert with
Georgiy Arbatov, who is now Director of the Institute of the USA and
Canada. (Counterpoint , v. 2, no.4, p. 6)
58
In actuality, differences of opinion do exist among the
Kremlin leadership, but they are more differences of degree rather
than kind. The Soviet leadership is much more able to present an
unified political front to the West. Not only is it expected but it is a
basic requirement for survival within the Party. The only dissidents in
the Soviet Union are not, and have no chances in the near future of
ever being, decision makers.
This idea of viewing the senior Soviet leadership as
mirror images of Western bureaucrats is what leads to such great
Western expectations when a new General Secretary is appointed by
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The West rapidly forgets
that there is only one political party in the Soviet Union and that no
man emerges as the Party leader unless he has a long and loyal history
in that organization and is approved by it.
2. US-Soviet Tensions Are the Fault of the West
The "evolving Soviets" argument proposes that communism
versus capitalism is not the reason for US-USSR tensions because the
Soviets are no longer limited by the narrow confines of ideology. A
second argument provides the "answer" that East-West tensions are
the result of Western aggression. Supporters for this argument pro-
pose that the Soviets have a history of being defense oriented because
they fear attack in general, and attack by the West in particular.
The first aim of this argument is to maintain the ideological
myth of aggressive "capitalist encirclement" which supports the con-
tinuity of the regime internally. This reasoning falls apart when you
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examine the record of economic assistance and cooperation between
the West and the Soviet Union and the record of Soviet aggression
against neighboring and far-flung states. From 1939 to 1941 and from
1946 to 1949, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was clearly
expansionist. The same pattern continues today. One student of
Soviet behavior has said, "If they are overarmed it is first of all because
militarism is the necessary prop and climate of every dictatorship ...
and because they do have aggressive designs." (Labin, 1960, p. 24)
The second aim of the argument that the Soviet military pos-
ture is defensive is to generate doubt among democratic leaders and
the Third World concerning the intentions of the United States
toward the Soviet Union, and by extension all other sovereign states.
If the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions, as the targets of
active measures are to believe, then the arms race and the threat of
nuclear war and the expenditure of funds for defense to the detriment
of efforts to improve the quality of life are all the fault of the
"aggressive imperialists."
The fact is that any Western move to defend against Soviet
arms buildups is labeled as aggressive, and any political move to sup-
port a country which resists communist encroachment, or to draw
attention to such expansionism, is denounced as starting the "cold
war." The Soviet practice has continued to be as Colonel-General
Agayants, head of Service A, directed:
We must constantly encourage Western journalists to write precisely
the opposite of our real intentions and anyone who writes or speaks
about our real intentions accurately or impartially in the Western
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sense of these words must quickly be dismissed and ridiculed as
someone of the Right or a fascist, someone who wants to bring back
McCarthyism. (Freemantle, 1982, p. 131)
The situation today is that the Soviet Union has been suc-
cessful, through the use of disinformation and deliberate support of
what Western leaders and the public would wish to believe, in turning
the perception of which intentions belong to what system upside
down.
3. The USSR is Against Nuclear Weapons and For Military
Balance
One of the most important deception themes of the Soviet
Union is the ongoing campaign to present itself as a peaceful, defense-
oriented nation that desires arms control and the establishment of a
nuclear free world.23 The parallel message of this theme is that the
United States is for the use of nuclear weapons and against
23For further information on deception and the antecedents of the
current arms control situation, the reader is directed to Brian D.
Dailey, Deception and Self-Deception in Arms Control: The ABM and
Outer Space Treaties Reconsidered . Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Southern California, August 1987; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, Has
Soviet Nuclear Strategy Changed? Report No. P-7181 (Santa Monica,
CA: Rand Corporation, December 1985).
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superpower parity. 24 The actual Soviet doctrine on war does not
match the message of this theme.
The Soviet view of why war occurs and the role it would play
in future wars may be summarized as follows: War is inevitable because
of economic strains within the capitalist system; war will last as long
as capitalist states survive; capitalist states, as their power declines,
will attack communist states, probably with nuclear weapons; but
communists are sure to win in the power struggle against the capital-
ist system because communism is the best form of government. (Lee
and Staar, 1986, pp. 24-25)
Under this system of beliefs, only four types of war are con-
sidered possible: (1) Wars between capitalist and communist states,
(2) wars of national liberation between underdeveloped countries and
their former colonizers, (3) internal civil wars between the disenfran-
chised and the powerful, and (4) wars between capitalist states. 25 The
only type of war which communist ideology considers just is a war to
24 It cannot be denied that one reason why the United States is at a
disadvantage in this argument is because it is the country which suc-
cessfully generated a nuclear explosion and the only country to have
ever used a nuclear device as a weapon. Regardless of the concurrent
efforts of the Germans, Japanese, and Soviets to develop an atomic
bomb; regardless of any possible benefit of the bomb in saving lives in
WW II that would have been lost through further conventional warfare,
and the peaceful uses to which nuclear power can be put, there is a
great deal of guilt and blame surrounding US use of the atomic bomb.
25In the case of civil wars, students in Soviet military academies are
taught that Marxist-Leninist ideology demands active support to "turn
the democratic revolution into a socialist one." (Scott and Scott,
1984, p. 67)
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defeat capitalism— waged either by peoples seeking independence
from capitalist rulers or by a socialist state. (Scott and Scott, 1984,
pp. 66-67)
Between 1953 and 1960, the Soviet leadership developed the
basic tenets of the warfighting doctrine it adheres to today. It was
decided that the objective of war was victory, which meant: (1) main-
tenance of Party control, (2) defeat of the capitalist countries and their
alliances, and (3) limiting damage to the Socialist Motherland. (Lee
and Staar, 1986, p. 35) Accordingly, "the essence of Soviet military
policy is to attain the forces required by its doctrine and strategy, the
final objectives of which are to be prepared to fight and win wars at all
levels, including a nuclear war." (Lee and Staar, 1986, p. 2)
One of the "forces" available to the Soviet Union is deception,
which is used to the utmost in presenting a public face for its nuclear
doctrine that is at odds with statements published for internal con-
sumption by the Soviet military and political elite.
In 1956, Premier Khrushchev declared that nuclear war was
no longer "fatally inevitable" because of the deterrent effect of the
growing Soviet atomic arsenal. From 1962 through 1968, Marshal of
the Soviet Union Sokolovskiy, expressed the Party leadership belief
that "the creation and constant maintenance of quantitative and quali-
tative superiority over the enemy in [the nuclear arena] ... represents
one of the most important tasks of construction of the armed forces in
the contemporary epoch." (Lee and Staar, 1986, p. 29)
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The Party emphasis in the 1950s and into the early 1970s
on survivability, superiority, and victory in nuclear war became a
political liability in the age of detente and arms control.26 It seemed
necessary for the Soviets to formulate a declaratory policy that would
accommodate "preferred Western images of deterrence, parity, and
stability." (Lambeth, 1985, p. 10) Brian Dailey points out that, during
the period of detente, Soviet censors were involved in removing
references to Soviet military superiority from the open press. The
results were such that, "by 1973, Soviet writings on military strategy
had begun to limit statements on not only superiority but also the dis-
cussion of the nuclear aspect [of military affairs]." (Dailey, 1987,
p. 386) In 1977, General Secretary Brezhnev formalized this practice
by indicating that the USSR was not interested in military superiority,
or preemptive nuclear strikes, and that it was uncertain that nuclear
war was winable. While later Soviet military sources have deempha-
sized Sokolovskiy's adherence to nuclear superiority for the purpose of
fighting a nuclear war, the emphasis and pursuit of Soviet military
superiority over the West remain.
The timing of what has come to be known as the Tula Line"
is interesting for various reasons. First, the speech was made just days
26Reference works for the new nuclear strategy include: Nikita
Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet, the
October 1961 speech to the 22nd Party Congress by Minister of
Defense Malinovskiy, and the 1962 text of Military Strategy by Marshal
of the Soviet Union Sokolovskiy. Excerpts from the above works are
found in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War:
Doctrine. Strategy, and Tactics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1982).
64
before the inauguration of President Carter. Second, the IID was
formed less than a year later to better coordinate Soviet propaganda
channels. Third, discussions of Soviet military intentions in every-
thing from Pravda to the Military Encyclopedia began to follow the
moderate line of Brezhnev's speech within the year. Since then,
Soviet propagandists have organized support for "no-first-use" cam-
paigns, touted the "obsolescence" of the Sokolovskiy texts on military
affairs, and stressed the need for the West to respond favorably to
Soviet moderation. (Dailey. 1987, pp. 392-393; Lee and Staar, 1986,
pp. 29-34)
Disinformation about the Soviet position on nuclear war is so
pervasive and requires the coordination of so many of the decision
makers and resources available to implement deception that the his-
tory and support effort for this theme could well serve as the
archetype of perceptions management operations. The next section
will highlight the evolution and current status of Soviet perceptions
management efforts through peace propaganda.
C. DECEPTION CAMPAIGNS
The first point to be aware of in peace propaganda is the differ-
ence in meaning between the Soviet and Western definitions of peace.
When Soviet officials speak of peace, they know hat it has both an
overt and a covert meaning. Soviet leaders employ a language called
"Sovietspeak" with its own particular grammar that is designed for
addressing different audiences:
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The grammar we are discussing has at least five voices: (1) for
speaking to foreigners ...; (2) for speaking to other elite Leninists;
(3) for speaking to the Soviet and other captive peoples; (4) for
speaking to free people; and (5) for speaking to the Third World.
(Bathurst, 1987, p. 94)
Sovietspeak is "that language used by the secret governmental struc-
ture whose voice is that of the Utopian myth." (Bathurst, 1987, p. 104)
In the Soviet Union, the past and the future are emphasized much
more than the present reality. The past is emphasized to selectively
establish a precedent for the current practices/conditions of the state,
while the future is emphasized as the occasion of the worldwide dicta-
torship of the proletariat, in the name of which current sacrifices are
being endured. The present is a dangerous subject for discussion
because of the discrepancy between the promise of communism and
the living conditions of the people under its rule.
When Soviet spokesmen refer to peace, on the covert level they
do not mean conditions of mutual friendship and cooperation among
different political systems as in the sense of the Western definition—
"internally, a state of domestic order, and externally, equilibrium and
an absence of war"; the Soviet concept of peace is expressed as:
... a condition in the world in which socialism, the first stage of
communism, had triumphed worldwide, class tensions had thus
been removed, and the conditions for true peace under Communist
leadership had come to pass. (Nitze, 1984/1985, pp. 363-364)
The interim stage before the "peace" ushered in by worldwide
Soviet leadership or rule by an extended network of satellite govern-
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ments is what has been referred to as "peaceful coexistence."27 The
phrase meant to Western politicians that they could live side by side
with the Soviets, putting aside not only the fear of armed conflict but
also the "cold war" ideological struggle. For the Kremlin leadership,
peaceful coexistence meant something entirely different. Peaceful
coexistence for the CPSU is an occasion for intensified ideological
struggle and an offensive against defense efforts in the West. It is a
chance to encourage "a condition of lack of resistance to Communist
forces or Communist operations." (Ashbrook, 1982, p. ii)
The second point to be aware of in an examination of Soviet activ-
ity in relation to the peace movement is the degree of secrecy with
which such dual meanings are treated. None of the above information
is allowed to come to light among those the Soviet Union seeks to use
in weakening the West and advancing its own foreign policy. As far as
relations are concerned with those who are not initiates in communist
ideology, or communist-ruled peoples, only the overt level of commu-
nication may be employed. The direction given to communist agita-
tors in 1953 is no less applicable today:
The communist agitation programme is to be carried out by means
of the "peace" campaign and "peace" is to be used as the principal
theme to justify whatever local communist interests demand. In
27Peaceful coexistence is a campaign announced by the CPSU in its
December 1960 New World Plan. The genesis of the plan was a secret
conference held in November 1960 among 81 of the world's 86 com-
munist parties. The benefit of peaceful coexistence would be "an
intensification of the struggle ... for the triumph of socialist ideas ...
helping towards world communism without the need for war."
(Clews, 1964, p. 60) The West referred to its later interpretation of
what it thought peaceful coexistence meant by the term detente.
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particular, all attempts to build up any organization to resist the
possible use of force by the Soviet Union must be prevented. A par-
ticular agitation is to be conducted against defence arrangements
made in co-operation with the Western Powers. (Clews, 1964,
p. 78)
The first peace campaign launched by the Soviet Union after the
wartime alliance with the United States and Britain was the Stock-
holm Appeal of 1950. This effort was spearheaded by the newly cre-
ated World Peace Council, which was more successful than previous
front organizations with more narrow activist platforms. With the war
just over, many people were eager to support an effort to bring peace
and try to control the awesome power of the atomic bomb. The
Stockholm Appeal called on governments to "Ban the Bomb" and was
successful in generating millions of signatures from nations around the
world. The WPC claimed to have generated 500 million signatures of
individuals anxious to prohibit atomic weapons from existing in
weapons stockpiles, yet the petition drive abruptly ended in 1953
when the Soviet Union detonated its first thermo-nuclear device.28
(Pincher, 1985, p. 200)
The Stockholm Appeal is important in the annals of Soviet active
measures, and activism in general, for three reasons. First, it demon-
strates the potential for activism rising out of the genuine concern
28Regardless of the fact that the US was willing in 1946 to submit to
direction by an international Atomic Development Authority, the Sovi-
ets pushed for a full ban and would not agree to uninvited on-site
inspection by a third party. The USSR had been studying the potential
for building an atomic bomb of its own since 1942, actually beginning
nuclear weapons research in March 1943. (Calvocoressi, 1982, pp.
5-9; Holloway, 1983, pp. 15-20)
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that exists among people who are faced with what they view as a
threatening situation. When presented with what they are told is a
solution to that perceived threat, people respond. Second, it demon-
strates the purely selfish motives that give rise to Soviet involvement
in an issue when the Politburo sees its desired margin of safety threat-
ened by the United States. Third, it clearly points out the Soviet
practice of encouraging a positive movement for its own ends, as long
as those ends are being accomplished. The Stockholm Appeal pro-
vides a model, in all of the particulars above, for the peace offensives
which were to follow.
1. The Anti-NATO INF Campaign
David Yost has used the available data on the Soviet four-year
anti-NATO campaign as a case study of efforts to influence the deci-
sions of Western policy makers in directions beneficial to the Soviet
Union.
When NATO members announced their approval of interme-
diate-range nuclear forces (INF) missile placement in December 1979,
and called for concurrent arms control negotiations with the Soviet
Union for elimination or reduction of INF missiles on both sides, this
signalled to the Soviets a willingness on the part of NATO to "make
and implement defense decisions" that could have disturbing conse-
quences in their direction and degree of cohesiveness. The deploy-
ment of INF missiles was sought in order to reduce European anxiety
over Soviet SS-20 INF missiles which were deployed within striking
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distance of Europe in early 1977. (Yost, 1987, p. 344; Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 1983, p. 2)
From December 1979 to November 1983, the Soviet Union
directed its attention to an effort to stop the deployment in Western
Europe of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II
ballistic missiles. Soviet efforts were centered on the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (FRG) because of West Germany's host-country status
for the majority of US troops in Europe, leadership in gross national
product, and premier position in conventional forces among US Euro-
pean allies.
The Soviet Union was unsuccessful in halting the deployment
of Pershing II and GLCM missiles, but their propaganda campaign
received a great deal of attention and pointed out successes in some
areas that may be useful in efforts to stop the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive. Kenneth Adelman, Director of the US Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency (ACDA), called the Soviet campaign the "most intense
and well orchestrated effort since the founding of NATO." (ACDA,
1983, p. 1)
The tactics used by the Soviet Union against the NATO deci-
sion included:
• Combining peaceful declarations with threatening statements.
• Playing upon pacifism.
• Portraying the West— in sharp contrast to the Soviet self-portrait—
as the obstacle to both disarmament and a reduction of interna-
tional tension.
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• Seeking to persuade public opinion in the West to believe that
their own government's actions responding defensively to Soviet
power and conduct are instead provocative of a Soviet response
and that the Soviets are the aggrieved party, reluctantly forced to
consider or pursue countermeasures.
• Carefully staging some rare opportunities for "news" from
Moscow, gaining access to millions of readers in the Western
democracies.
• Granting rare interviews with foreign correspondents, to insure
an audience for Soviet views. (ACDA, 1983, pp. 1-2)
Through consistency and constant pressure, the Soviets were
successful in getting Socialist and Social Democratic parties to
endorse key issues, generating the development of opposition parties
who openly proclaimed a pro-Soviet line, obtaining public sympathy
for the Soviet view of "equal blame" for both superpowers as to why
previous arms talks failed, and spreading the point of view that "the
deployments are being carried out against the will of the people and
are therefore illegitimate." (Yost, 1987, pp. 345-346) As a result of
the tactics listed above, and the success in strengthening opposition
parties in Europe, three lasting achievements were made possible:
1. Polarization of political parties, resulting in disunity among deci-
sion makers,
2. Delegitimization of the US role in protecting Western Europe and
directing arms control efforts,
3. A common socializing experience for many European youths who
do not feel the same gratitude toward the United States as earlier
generations and who are more in favor of neutrality. (Yost, pp.
345-346)
The combination of overt and covert material, tailoring of
themes to fit the expectations and weaknesses of the audience, and
alternating between conciliatory and threatening behavior are all
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classic disinformation ploys. What remains interesting is the difficulty
in interpreting how much of the anti-NATO activity was due to Soviet
influence during the anti-INF campaign, how much was due to intra-
Alliance and internal German concerns, and how much was due to
previous Soviet "reality management" that took place from the mid-
1960s up through 1979. The emphasis on peaceful coexistence and
detente at this time led to a set of expectations, chief among which
was that the military buildup of the USSR could be ignored while
emphasis was placed on viewing the Soviets as fair and reasonable.
The Soviets of course supported this "wishful thinking," but Western
governments were equally responsible for only attending to that which
they wished to see. When the pendulum swung back, and the West
noticed the balance of military power in Europe definitely shifting
towards the Soviets, it was an emotionally and politically wrenching
experience to recognize the new reality. In balance,
peacetime perceptions management ... may be able to structure and
cultivate perceptions far in advance for exploitation on a later occa-
sion. The hypothesis may exaggerate the degree of conscious Soviet
complicity with Western wishful thinking and self-deception during
the era of detente, but— however crudely— it seems to account for
many of the facts. (Yost, 1987, p. 367)
2. The Anti-SDI Campaign
The Soviet campaign against the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) resembles the 1979-1983 anti-INF campaign in the use of the
same tactics to influence perceptions of US and Soviet intentions.
The current arms control disinformation campaign also differs from
the earlier INF effort in certain ways. First, the anti-SDI campaign
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benefits from an established infrastructure of front organizations and
peace activists who are receptive to Soviet overtures. Second, the
Soviets are more experienced in the use of Western communications
channels as forums for their point of view. Also, there are higher
stakes involved in this campaign for the USSR if the movement to halt
SDI research is unsuccessful.
Regardless of the fact that SDI is only in the research stage,
the offer by the US to share the technology of SDI if it proves feasible,
and the characterization by the President of SDI as a "search for ways
to reduce the danger of nuclear war," the Soviets have not responded
to SDI as a military challenge which they can meet or in which they
have an inherent advantage (ACDA, 1986, p. 2; Stevens, 1986, p. 697).
Sayre Stevens believes that
the Soviets see SDI as a basic challenge to their accomplishments in
matching the strategic might of the United States and in projecting
that image to the world at large.... If the Soviets are to take advan-
tage of their momentum and steadfast pursuit of military programs,
they need stable and predictable competition. SDI is a disturbing
complication.... SDI also poses a type of head to head technological
competition that the Soviets have avoided in the past and seem to
fear. (Stevens, 1986, p. 698)
a. Soviet Anti-SDI Arguments
According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the arguments posed by the Soviets against SDI are a
combination of long-standing propaganda themes and new points par-
ticular to the SDI campaign. The arguments are that: (1) SDI is a
first-strike system; (2) SDI is destabilizing, making arms control
negotiations difficult and starting an arms race; (3) SDI will lead to the
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militarization of space; (4) SDI is a violation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic
Missile Treaty; (5) SDI is technically infeasible; and (6) SDI will be too
costly. The last two points are ones which the Soviets acquired by
virtue of using arguments first made by those within the US who ques-
tion the merits of SDI. (ACDA, 1986, pp. 5-12)
Responses to three of the arguments listed above serve as
examples of the one-sided and deceptive nature of Soviet disinforma-
tion in efforts to meet their political needs:
1. SDI is "destabilizing ." A Soviet spokesman said of SDI that it "is
another attempt to disrupt the strategic military parity between
the USSR and the United States." (ACDA, 1986, p. 7) As noted
previously, parity between the USSR and the US was never a
stated concern for the Soviets until the period of detente in the
mid 1970s. In fact Soviet propaganda operates under the
assumption that "U.S. military programs always "upset" the bal-
ance, while Soviet military programs always "maintain" the bal-
ance." (ACDA, 1986, p. 7)
2. SDI Violates the ABM Treaty . Marshal Grechko said to the
Supreme Soviet in 1972 that "The ABM Treaty does not place
any limitations on carrying out research and experimental work
directed towards solving the problems of defence of the country
against nuclear missile attack." (Pincher, 1985, p. 232) An obvi-
ous question then follows that, if it is permissible for the Soviet
Union to do research in advanced ABM methods, why not for the
US? The only possible reason is that the Soviet Union would
prefer to restrict US advancement while at the same time they
"protect the advantages earned through their massive invest-
ments in passive and active forms of strategic defense." (Yost,
1985, p. 289)
3. SDI Will Cause the Militarization of Space . The Soviet Union
tested the first anti-satellite weapon in the late 1960s. In 1977,
the US began ASAT research in response. Only the Soviets have a
working space-based anti-satellite system. Available evidence
indicates that militarization of space is a problem for the Kremlin
only when it is not unilateral.
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The coordination of anti-SDI statements by Soviet lead-
ers, government spokesmen, and representatives of front organiza-
tions provides some insight into the importance of this particular
campaign in the overall program of strategic deception. According to
the CIA, the purpose of the anti-SDI campaign is to
limit President Reagan's political flexibility in dealing in bilateral
discussions and arms control negotiations. Its tactical goals are
designed to mobilize opposition to President Reagan's defense pro-
gram— and particularly SDI— among our allies and in our country.
This campaign attempts to bring the widest range of economic,
moral, political and international pressures to bear on the President
in an effort to force him to restrict some or all of his SDI program.
(Casey, 1985, p. 4)
The anti-SDI campaign is the latest peace and military
balance disinformation effort in the history of Soviet disinformation
campaigns against the United States. The Soviet Union has been suc-
cessful in focusing the attention of the public and the media, as it tries
to do for all disinformation campaigns, on the activities and intentions
of the US rather than itself. The anti-SDI campaign can be expected
to continue into the foreseeable future, with renewed pressure on the
US and her allies as the election of a new president approaches.
D. SUMMARY
The Soviet Union not only has a large organization for the creation
and direction of deceptive activity but the organization is supported by
numerous channels of information, all relaying the same themes in
support of pro-Soviet campaigns. The combination of media
manipulation efforts, appeals to desires to make a positive contribution
through fronts and friendship societies, and deception themes that
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appeal to Western beliefs provides a formidable support network for
successful Soviet perceptions management.
Through the use of front organizations and formal cultural
exchange, Moscow is able to spread the pro-communist point of view
among a widening group of people, not just the "politically active."
Whether the spokesman is a government bureaucrat, a journalist, a
scholar, or an individual visiting the West for a person-to-person
exchange, its purpose is to foster a positive image of the Soviet Union.
If a negative image of the United States or Western practices is
implied as a result, so be it.
Each time a Western practice can be placed in a negative light,
through the use of half-truths or complete falsehoods, those who
practice Soviet foreign policy can avoid the spotlight. The name of the
game in deception is to create doubt and negative feeling towards the
adversary while discussing your own practices as little as possible.
Evolution of the state, supposed Western responsibility for the tense
relations between the superpowers, and proclaimed Soviet readiness
to abandon a nuclear defense all serve as enticing arguments to keep
the ignorant or unwary from closer examination of the past practices
and future intentions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Current Soviet efforts to be seen as "just one of the larger coun-
tries in Europe," with the same concerns and desire for goodwill as
the rest, are continuing misdirections away from the more difficult
issues of communist ideology, domestic conditions, and foreign prac-
tice. Efforts against intermediate-range nuclear forces or the
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Strategic Defense Initiative are the latest and some of the most
specific of Soviet campaigns against Western democracies and in
support of the foreign policy interests of the USSR. The general
themes supporting a positive view of Soviet policies and a negative
view of US policies are just as important as specific efforts which
come and go. As situations change, campaigns of deception change
also. What does not change is the intended message.
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V. WESTERN RESPONSE TO DISINFORMATION
A. DEMOCRATIC VULNERABILITY
One of the most important questions in the study of Soviet
deception is the degree to which democratic governments are
susceptible; specifically, to efforts to advance Soviet foreign policy
while frustrating the foreign policy goals of democracies. The Soviets
understand that the key to success in deception is found within the
structure of democratic government. In addition to the failure of
Western governments to heighten public awareness of the deception
threat, three factors are proposed as sources of democratic
vulnerability to Soviet deception: the open nature of the democratic
system, Soviet ability to exploit weaknesses in democratic
government, and differences in the way Americans and Soviets view
the world.
The openness of democratic governments and the strong
influence of public opinion on policy are extremely helpful in Soviet
perceptions management efforts. The degree of public participation
in policy formation is a major obstacle to countering disinformation,
when the public is uninformed of the nature and intent of Soviet
perceptions management. The United States is founded on a system
of participatory politics which permits and encourages public
involvement in decision making. To the benefit of those working
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against US policy, that involvement may take the form of protest, both
before and after policy has been formulated. 29
Jean-Francois Revel proposed that democracy "is not basically
structured to defend itself against outside enemies seeking its
annihilation," particularly when the enemy is a totalitarian government
(Revel, 1985, p. 3). He goes on to say that democratic leaders
generally fail to understand the threat posed to them by a totalitarian
system. The utility of disinformation in defeating democratic efforts to
withstand communist expansion is made possible. Revel believes, by
the nature of democracy itself.
1. The Nature of Democracy
Former US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has described a
democratic government as one "whose rulers are chosen in periodic,
competitive elections that feature widespread suffrage, free speech,
and free assembly." (Kirkpatrick, 1983, p. 238) Revel views
democracy as "a form of society reconciling governmental efficiency
with legitimacy, [and] authority with individual freedoms." (Revel,
1985, p. 3) By either definition, American or Western democracy is
clearly different from the Soviet totalitarian model of government.
The differences between democracy and totalitarianism are a strength
and a weakness when confronting Soviet disinformation.
29According to Soviet spokesman Vladimir Posner, in the Soviet Union
an individual is not allowed "to conduct a campaign against his own
government." (Struck, 1986, p. 3) This is true even in the case of
individuals like Dr. Andrei Sakharov, whose "campaign" has consisted
of nothing more than criticism of government policy.
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The aim of a democracy is to improve the life and system of
government for the people, with all segments of society taking an
active part in developing and implementing the improvements.
Because the democratic system gives rise to an open society, demo-
cratic governments are subject to various pressures which totalitarian
systems do not face to the same degree.
Internal dissent, conflicting demands by separate groups who
may place their own needs above those of others, and the activity of
opposing governments whose representatives have easy entree to the
political system all place stress on a democracy and the ability of the
government to live up to democratic ideals. A careful balance must be
struck in response to internal dissent and Soviet overt or covert
efforts to influence policy formation.
Two distinctions are important in this regard: first, the dis-
tinction between honest negotiations among governments and diver-
sionary tactics or obfuscation; second, the distinction between honest
argument in domestic policy debate and propaganda. In both cases,
even as they welcome the former, open societies must be particularly
on guard against the latter. (ACDA, 1986, p. 2)
2. Strengths Made Weaknesses
The vulnerability of the West to Soviet disinformation
increases when what are actually internal strengths are turned against
democratic governments by an external opponent. These strengths
include (1) the high value placed on public opinion as a factor influ-
encing government policy, (2) the assertion that government exists to
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meet the needs of the people, and (3) the tendency to ascribe demo-
cratic ideals and intentions to other governments. All of the preced-
ing qualities give democratic governments a balance of humanism and
hopefulness that has been sustaining and attractive, yet these same
qualities are also an Achilles heel.
The negative consequences of reliance on public opinion and
valuing meeting the needs of the people are oversensitivity to con-
flicting demands, an inability to reach a consensus on the proper
action to take, and difficulty in making a timely response to threaten-
ing situations. This inclination to "paralysis" applies not only within
individual democracies but also among the democratic alliance as a
whole. The negative consequences of ascribing common democratic
goals to other governments are confusion and frustration when foreign
policy interactions do not proceed as expected.
The essence of mirror-imaging and self-deception lies in
"insisting upon seeing and believing what one wants to believe,
despite evidence to the contrary." (Kartchner, 1987, pp. 160-161) In
a world where not all political systems are based on the democratic
ideal of mutually beneficial existence, it is foolish for the United States
to engage in mirror-imaging and self-deception.
In some ways, the democratic political system is set up to fail
in comparison with other governments. Democracy sets such high
ideals for itself, and accepts nothing less than perfect accomplishment
of those ideals, that belief in the democratic system becomes hard to
maintain. Among democracies, "constant self-condemnation, often
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with little or no foundation, is a source of weakness and inferiority."
(Revel, 1985, p. 9) Democratic governments strive for perfection and
feel guilty because they are not perfect. When deception is employed
"to project to the democratic world an embellished image of the
socialist countries and a blackened picture of the others," the cycle of
guilt is reinforced. (Revel, 1985, p. 166)
3. Perceptual and Ethical Limitations
A third factor which makes democracies susceptible to Soviet
deceptive practices is perceptual and ethical limitations on the way
information is processed. Various authors have proposed that Ameri-
cans do not readily understand either Soviet motivations or their
behavior. The major reasons given for this are twofold— differing
ethics and perceptual bias. First discussed will be the difference in
culture and history, leading to different expectations for proper
behavior between the two cultures.30
a. Ethical Differences
Dr. Vladimir Lefebvre, formerly a mathematician for the
Soviet Ministry of Defense, is a Soviet emigre who writes on the ethi-
cal differences between the Soviet Union and the United States.
According to Lefebvre, "Christian [Western] ideology is based on pro-
30For a thorough discussion of cultural effects on Russian/ Soviet
behavior, see Marquis deCustine, Journey For Our Time . Phillis Penn
Kohler, ed. and trans. (London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1951); Ronald
Hingley, The Russian Mind (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons,
1977); and Vladimir A. Lefebvre, Algebra of Conscience: A Compara-
tive Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982).
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hibition of evil : [while] Soviet ideology is based on declaration of good ."
(Lefebvre, 1982, p. 83) This results in two completely different ways
of looking at the place of the individual, and the state, in the world.
Western ideology is full of prohibitions on what not to do, leading to
valuing confrontation between good and evil. At the same time, any
compromise of good with evil is regarded as evil. Lefebvre believes
that, in a conflict where both parties adhere to this system, both will
be motivated to make compromises in order to achieve what both par-
ties can agree on as good.
In Soviet ideology, although there is a declaration of
good, "there is no prohibition against perpetrating evil." (Lefebvre,
1982, p. 85) This results in a view of morality where compromise by
good toward evil is seen as good. Confrontation between good and evil
is regarded as evil. In short, under the "prohibition of evir system, if
a person has difficulty deciding between good and evil, he still may not
choose evil. Under the "declaration of good" system, if a person has
trouble deciding which action to take, he is not admonished or made
to feel guilty if he chooses evil.31
The result of disputes under the "declaration of good"
system— whether both antagonists believe in the system or not— is that
3Man Sejna, former secretary of the Czechoslovakia Defense council,
recalls General Secretary Khrushchev instructing Warsaw pact leaders
that "anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral."
(Douglass and Sejna, 1986, p. 24) Khrushchev took his lead from
Lenin, who stated, "Our morality is completely subordinated to the
class struggle of the proletariat ... everything that is done in the prole-
tarian cause is honest." (Conquest, 187, p. 124)
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conflict is valued more than compromise. Because of the lack of a
standard against evil held by at least one of the antagonists, compro-
mise for the common good will be difficult to achieve.
In comparing the democratic and communist political
systems, Lefebvre's ethical model seems to hold. The failure of the
Soviet Union to meet its ideals is routinely dismissed by some
observers because the Soviet government rests on an ideology which
proclaims that communism will produce good results in the end. At
the same time, the United States is routinely criticized for falling
short of its ideals because democracy rests on a system that prohibits
evil at any stage of development. This artificial double standard is
exploited by Soviet directors of perceptions management because the
artificiality of it is generally unrecognized by those whose opinions are
being influenced against the democratic system.
b. Perceptual Limitations
A difference in viewpoint on what constitutes ethical
behavior on the part of the Soviet Union is an insufficient explanation
for the success of communist deception efforts. Another contributing
factor in democratic vulnerability to Soviet deception efforts is the way
the public, policy makers, and opinion leaders in the West perceive
the world around them. This is the tendency of Americans to be
biased when forming perceptions of other cultures.
The chief perceptual difficulty that Americans in partic-
ular have with Soviet intentions has been mentioned before under the
common phrase "mirror imaging." This representative bias, the
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"tendency to perceive other cultures as being similar (representative)
to North American culture" is only one of many ways in which our
biases of experience and expectation interfere with an objective con-
struction of reality.32 (Lauren, 1987, p. 104) The difference in ethical
systems discussed by Lefebvre has practical consequences in the way
perceptions are utilized. When the US and the USSR meet at the
negotiating table, not only is the US inclined to reach a compromise
where both parties may benefit but the negotiators subconsciously
believe that the Soviets want the same thing— mirror imaging. From
the Soviet point of view, "the aim of negotiation has never been to
reach a lasting agreement but to weaken their adversary and prepare it
to make further concessions while fostering his illusion that the new
concessions will be the last." (Revel, 1985, p. 350) Agreements that
the passage of time shows favored the Soviet position, the readiness to
form such agreements, and belief that mutual benefit would occur are
the result of mirror imaging.
The United States engages in self-deception where the
Soviet Union is concerned by being too ready to believe the worst of
itself and the best of the Soviets. Because most democratic policy
makers and opinion leaders are more practiced in self criticism than
in objective appraisal and criticism of Western and Soviet faults, "it
requires no vast effort on the part of the USSR to engage in strategic
32For a concise review of biases and their implications, see Steven
Lauren, An Introduction to Problems in Understanding and Predicting
Soviet Behavior— A Psychological and Cultural Approach . Masters The-
sis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), pp. 17-56.
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deception, simply exploiting such predispositions on the part of
Westerners." (Ra'anan, 1987, p. 143)
B. RESPONDING TO DISINFORMATION
The responsibility of the United States is to make workable for-
eign policy in the face of Soviet efforts to deceive opinion leaders,
policy makers, and the public about the true goals and intentions of
Soviet and Western policy. The USSR experiences continued success
in elevating its image at the expense of the West, yet much of the tar-
nished image of the United States originates in deceptive information.
This indicates that information on the workings of Soviet perceptions
management is underutilized and misdirected.
1. Identification
Identification— bringing Soviet disinformation into the open-
is the first step required for the US to turn the tide of psychological
war in its favor. As former CIA Director Casey has said,
Our best defense against [active measures] is to tell the truth about
the attempt to manipulate us. If people really understand the Soviet
use of active measures as a significant instrument of policy, they
stand a good chance of not being manipulated. (Casey, 1985, p. 4)
The public, opinion leaders, and politicians all must be educated about
the threat and tactics of Soviet disinformation. This education pro-
gram must originate with the policy makers and needs to include
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identification of current Soviet deceptive activity and admission of past
mistakes through US self deception.33
Because much of Soviet deception surfaces outside the United
States, government representatives overseas provide information on
developments in Soviet propaganda campaigns. Stanton Burnett of
USIA points out that
USIA posts abroad are often the first U.S. Government people to be
aware of forgeries or disinformation. Posts abroad inform USIA, the
Section for Policy Guidance, and are provided with data to expose
the forgeries. USIA distributes U.S. Government publications on
active measures and uses the Voice of America, the Wireless File,
TV, and the Foreign Press Center to counter forgeries and other
active measures. (Congress, 1985, p. 54)
Numerous organizations in the United States are involved in
the effort to identify and counteract the effects of Soviet disinforma-
tion. Among them are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, the United
States Information Agency (USIA) and the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency (ACDA). All of these agencies— plus the Department of
Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National
Security Council— are involved in the Interagency Active Measures
Working Group established under the State Department's Bureau of
33Alexander Solzhenitsyn points out the gravest of these past mistakes
as the Western failure to dictate peace terms to Stalin at the end of
World War II. He believes this failure resulted in "one capitulation
after another" and a current state of mind which says "give in as
quickly as possible, give up as quickly as possible, peace and quiet at
any cost." (Solzhenitsyn, 1986, pp. 23-24)
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Intelligence and Research in 198 1. 34 According to the State Depart-
ment Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, the purpose of the group is to
counter active measures through a strategy of educating govern-
ments, the media, and public opinion as a whole.... the working
group has published about 20 or so unclassified reports on active
measures-related topics [and has] coordinated numerous sessions
with interested journalists that have resulted in highly useful pieces
appearing in domestic and foreign media. (Congress, 1985, p. 52) i
In 1983, the President announced "that it is necessary to
strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of the various
aspects of public diplomacy of the United States Government relative
to national security. " Public diplomacy was defined as "those actions
of the U.S. Government designed to generate support for our national
security objectives. " (Dandar, 1985, p. 41) Since the coordination of
public diplomacy efforts, the Chairman of the Working Group feels that
their efforts have been
successful, over time, in raising awareness, in raising consciousness
about this problem, particularly among opinion leaders and the
media. To the extent that we have made the media more aware than
they used to be that this sort of thing does go on, that it is not an
absurd idea of ours, they are increasingly inclined to check an
incoming, anonymous document far more carefully that they used to
be. In that sense, we are able to stifle, to silence, active measures.
(Congress, 1985, p. 123)
A major limiting factor in using identification as a response to
Soviet disinformation is the impossibility of undoing the damage done
by the release of the falsified information. An FBI spokesman testified
34In October 1986, the State Department gained an office of its own,
solely dedicated to the study of active measures: the Office of Active
Measures Analysis and Response.
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that The Soviets believe that even when the United States Govern-
ment issues prompt denials of the authenticity of a forged document,
the denial will never entirely offset the damage done by the initial
release." (Congress, 1985, p. 29) The best that can be hoped for is
that, as more governments become aware of the disinformation pro-
cess through identification of bogus materials, later Soviet efforts to
use the same techniques will be less successful.
2. Increasing Democratic Self-Confldence
The second step in countering Soviet disinformation is to
improve the self-confidence of the American public. Jeane Kirkpatrick
has pointed out that "the reluctance of the nation's major institutions
to take responsibility for the preservation of the society's values and
institutions is one of the striking characteristics of American life in
the last decade or so." (Kirkpatrick, 1982, p. 240) If insufficient
numbers of citizens involve themselves in the processes of govern-
ment through apathy or belief that the American democratic system is
unworthy, then any amount of foreign goodwill and support against
Soviet deception will cease to matter.
One of the most vital elements of this step is educating policy
makers and the public in a rational foreign policy stance toward the
Soviet Union. Alexander Solzhenitsyn has called for an end to Western
concessions to Soviet aggression, saying that "only firmness makes it
possible to withstand the assaults of Communist totalitarianism."
(Solzhenitsyn, 1986, p. 42) Professor Richard Pipes points out that
"once the principle has been established that irritating or standing up
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to the Soviet Union must be avoided at all costs, no matter how grave
the provocation, an important psychological battle has been lost."
(Pipes, 1984, p. 68) Organizations such as the National Endowment
for Democracy are helpful in supporting democratic concepts abroad,
but democracy needs strengthening at home also. Unless the crisis of
American confidence is addressed, the United States will succumb to
the self-doubt and the negative image that Soviet perceptions man-
agement is designed to engender.
3. Restriction of Soviet Interference in Domestic Politics
In 1965, the Soviet Union began an "offensive against the
positions of imperialism, " which meant an increase in efforts to
legitimize Soviet involvement in crisis "resolution." Foreign Minister
Gromyko declared in 1968 that, "during any acute situation, however
far away it appears from our country, the Soviet Union's reaction is to
be expected in all capitals of the world." (Conquest . 1987, p. 128) By
1971, according to Mr. Gromyko, the assumption of Soviet involve-
ment in world events meant that "there is no question of any signifi-
cance that can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to
it." (Pipes, 1984, p. 69) The problem with this point of view for the
Western democracies is that the Soviets fully expect their opinion to
be solicited and attended to when the President of the United States
makes a State of the Union Address, but it is somehow "improper" for
the US to comment on Soviet-Eastern Bloc developments. Obviously
the Soviets do not consider superpower commentary on domestic
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issues to be a two-way street. Each time the West abides by this Soviet
restriction, democratic influence in world affairs is diminished.
After identification of instances of Soviet deception and dis-
information targeted against the West, and US efforts to strengthen
internal support for democratic ideals and practices, the next step in
countering disinformation is to restrict the ability of the Soviets to
interfere in US domestic politics. The former Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs suggests that this is best done by "exposing
and removing the foreign instruments of intervention, such as the
diplomat who engages in improper activities or the foreign journalist
whose position is a cover for disinformation activities." (Eagleburger,
1983, p. 11)
One of the top Soviet espionage priorities is "access to U.S.
national decision making." The Soviets are helped in this effort by the
openness of the democratic process and by their estimated "1,400
full-time Soviet Bloc intelligence officers under "legal" covers as
diplomats, trade-mission officials, U.N. employees, and journalists."
(Rees, 1985, p. 14) All of these individuals are allowed to travel
within the United States with very few restrictions, making contact
with influential businessmen and legislators along the way. Professor
Pipes has proposed that "the West should instantly close ranks when-
ever the Soviet Union attempts to take sides in [alliance or domestic
politics]." (Pipes, 1984, p. 247) Given the value attached to intra -
party or alliance debate, however, the possibility of such a closing of
ranks is slim. A much more useful way to reduce Soviet ability to
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involve themselves in Western policy making is the expulsion of excess
Soviet personnel in "support" roles in the United States and expulsion
of Soviets found to be engaging in espionage. Limiting the number of
Soviets able to target legislators and other leaders, along with educa-
tion to make target groups for Soviet cooption (the media, activists)
aware of their utility as "unwitting agents," should work to reduce
Soviet effectiveness in political intervention.
C. THE CHALLENGE OF GLASNOST
The United States has a 70-year history of political dealings with
the Soviet Union and has come belatedly to realize that "the Soviets
take a long-term view ... that the cumulative impact of active measures
makes their considerable investment worthwhile." (Congress, 1985,
p. 45) Serious effort has been made during the past decade to
observe and understand the Soviet philosophy and practice of percep-
tions management, but the process under study continues to evolve.
As the public relations policy of the USSR changes, the United States
must continue to keep the goals of Soviet perceptions management in
mind.
One of the greatest challenges facing American foreign policy with
respect to the Soviet Union is the question of how to respond to Gen-
eral Secretary Gorbachev's policy of glasnost Gorbachev made a plea
upon his election for "speeding up the country's social and economic
development.... The point at issue is restructuring the material and
technical base of production." (Gorbachev, 1985, p. 386) On the
domestic scene, "the party regards the further perfection and
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development of democracy, of the entire system of socialist self-
government of the people as one of the vital tasks of domestic policy."
(Gorbachev, 1985, p. 387)
Closely related to the issue of the role disinformation may play in
glasnost is the admonition that
We must still further develop publicity in the work of party, state,
government and public organizations.... The better informed the
people, the more consciously they act, the more actively they sup-
port the party and its plans and programmatic objectives.
(Gorbachev, 1985, p. 387)
As journalist Robert Kaiser points out, The new policy of glasnost
(openness) and the call for perestroika (restructuring) are tactics
intended to revive the system, not admissions of failure." (Kaiser,
1986-87, p. 244) Gorbachev is unlikely to believe that the Soviet sys-
tem has failed or is doomed to failure; rather his position is one of
pointing out and correcting faults so that the Soviet Union may
"become still more rich and powerful and for the creative forces of
socialism to reveal themselves even more fully." (Gorbachev, 1985,
p. 388)
All of the above is glasnost, the new Soviet image formally
announced to the Western world at Gorbachev's ascension to power.
Glasnost is intended to indicate a new openness within the Soviet
Union, to lead to strengthening of the Soviet economy, and to indicate
willingness to negotiate with the West for mutually satisfactory resolu-
tion of differences. Western negotiators have not yet seen the types of
substantive changes that would give life to the "openness" of glasnost
Democratic governments must realize, however, that openness will be
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selective, that negotiations will still be selective. The CPSU will retain
totalitarian control of the USSR and a totalitarian approach to relations
with other governments during this "development of democracy."
The new General Secretary has clearly said that, "the solution of the
complex tasks we are faced with presupposes a further strengthening
of the party and the enhancement of its organizing and guiding role."
(Gorbachev, 1985, p. 387)
Glasnost, rather than being a new approach in external relations,
is the latest manifestation of the Leninist directive to "tell the West
what they want to hear, meanwhile strengthen your position."
Changes are being made within the Soviet Union under glasnost— peo-
ple are encouraged to criticize their senior comrades and the econ-
omy is improving— but qualified openness has been seen before under
different Soviet rulers. Changes in East-West relations are, as yet,
cosmetic. It has been said that "Gorbachev brings a new verve and
style to Soviet foreign policy. Many years after they might have, the
Soviets have finally learned the tricks of public relations." (Kaiser,
1986-87, p. 251)
The challenge to democratic governments today is to separate the
wheat from the chaff of glasnost. We can not afford to believe the
1980s' "New Soviet Man" to such an extent that we sacrifice our cau-
tion in the face of continuing Soviet intentions to export their form of
government. Communist spokesmen were quick to make it clear in
TASS and Pravda that, regardless of the appointment of a new general
secretary,
94
building the new society and improving developed socialism is
inconceivable without the leading and guiding role of the Communist
Party.... [The CPSU] is following unflaggingly the road charted by
Lenin and will never deviate from that road. (FBIS, 1985, p. R12;
ibid., p. R3)
The democracies should not expect a lessening of the East-West com-
petition because information on domestic problems of the Soviet
Union is being released and a friendlier face is being worn by the
spokesmen who transmit Soviet policy and intentions.
Taking advantage of the opportunity glasnost provides for
improved relations with the Soviet Union is equally as important as
remaining cautious. What the West should look for from this new
openness is a decrease in the application of perceptions management
practices against the US and her allies, a willingness to make conces-
sions in negotiations without the requirement for the West to make
the first move, and Soviet adherence to previously negotiated treaties
and agreements. Without moves in these directions by the Soviets,
glasnost will remain a hollow promise of change.
D. SUMMARY
In considering foreign policy and the potential to be misled
through disinformation, it is ironic that the strengths of democracy
are also its weaknesses. The West has become its own worst enemy
through the habit of believing negative things about the democratic
system of government more readily than it even questions the pro-
fessed world view and intentions of the Soviet Union. Although an
open society has shown itself to be strong, vibrant, and adaptable, the
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open nature of democracy is a hindrance when trying to prevent
Soviet utilization of the participatory politics model.
In countering Soviet disinformation, the West must learn to pre-
vent its effects rather than simply responding to Soviet initiatives. A
basic preventative is the admission that ignorance and minimization of
Soviet disinformation threatens the functioning of democracy. Demo-
cratic governments and peoples must give up their cherished view of
the world as filled with other reasonable governments and people who
will respond to reason "just like us." The events of history show that
the Soviet Union does not reason just like the West, and there is no
reason to expect her leaders to do so. Accommodating the reality of
disinformation as factor in US-Soviet interaction requires walking a
tightrope between too cynical a view and a too hopeful a one. To
expect that the USSR will never change its aggressive foreign policy
would be just as crippling as to abandon seeking ways to meet the
challenge of Soviet ideological warfare on Western terms. A middle
ground must be found. Democracies need to welcome new opportuni-
ties for better relations such as glasnost yet remain cautious enough to
base their hopefulness and compromises on concrete actions by the
Soviets rather than words.
The response of the West to Soviet disinformation has been slow
to organize and faces the challenge of an adversary network that is
extensive and well practiced. Despite these difficulties, improvements
are taking place in the awareness of Soviet deception techniques by
influential Americans and US allies. In responding to disinformation,
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it is vitally important that the United States not resort to Soviet tactics
of spreading lies in an effort to improve its image abroad and at home.
The coordinator of USIA efforts against Soviet active measures has
said, "we believe we can defeat forgeries and disinformation by truth.
We do not spread disinformation as a weapon ourselves, in part for the
moral reasons, but in part also for the very practical reason, that we
are very proud of and jealous of our credibility." (Congress, 1985,
p. 112) This approach of truthfulness may be the only one democracy
can bear.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Soviet Union and the United States are involved in an
ideological battle in support of their foreign policies and ways of gov-
ernment. The chief tool used by the Soviet Union is negative disin-
formation about the policies and intentions of the US and positive
disinformation about he policies and intentions of the USSR. At stake
in what the United States Information Agency calls the "war of ideas"
is the positive opinion and support of foreign and domestic audiences.
This battle is a long-acknowledged one on the part of the Soviet Union
but is only partially understood and sporadically embraced by the
United States. From the point of view of the US government,
perceptions management on a broad scale is something to be
attempted only in time of war.
The greatest aids to the Soviets in the ideological war are their
unified and offensive position and lack of awareness in the West, both
as to the magnitude of their effort and their true goals. The Soviet
practice is to be on the offensive against democratic governments-
trying to keep the US and her allies engaged in response to, or suspi-
cion of, alleged democratic wrongdoing. The direction of deceptive
campaigns against US foreign policy originates at the highest level of
the Soviet power structure, within the Politburo. With the authority of
the Politburo, government agencies such as the Propaganda Depart-
ment, the International Department, and the Committee for State
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Security present a united front of anti-US disinformation and covert
active measures operations. Combining the work of these agencies
with the deceptive statements of Soviet policy makers ensures that
the channels for perceptions management are many, varied, and far-
reaching.
Equally important is the fact that public opinion in the Soviet
Union does not affect government actions and decision making. The
Soviet leadership is free to attack Western behavior without being held
internally accountable in any meaningful way for what they themselves
say or do. Under the Soviet system of totalitarian communism,
Marxist-Leninist ideology is used to justify every decision on the part
of the Kremlin leadership. The Soviet people are taught that their
leadership and cause are infallible, and dissension is swiftly and con-
sistently punished. These factors severely limit informed public par-
ticipation in Soviet government, and protest concerning Kremlin
policy has come to be out of the question.
The Soviet propensity for deception makes foreign policy rela-
tions with them extremely difficult. In the absence of evidence that
the Soviet Union will soon change its deceptive practices, the West
must continue efforts to be aware of, advertise, and confront decep-
tion, yet at the same time remain ready to take advantage of true
Soviet openness. The continued security of the United States depends
heavily upon increased awareness and effective countering of Soviet
efforts to deceive the public, opinion leaders, and policy makers. The
Kremlin will continue to take advantage of any divisions or
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complacency among democratic governments. Kremlin leaders are
experienced in efforts to manage how others perceive them. The
strength of the West, and of the US in particular, is that the democra-
cies are slowly becoming more aware of the importance of freeing
themselves from the Soviet-imposed point of view.
A fundamental task in reducing Western susceptibility to decep-
tion is to acknowledge that democracy is not perfect and neither is
communism. Lacking a utopia of either kind, the prudent method of
comparison is to judge the opposing systems on their practices today,
in the real world. In order to do that, the West must part the curtain
of deception and ignorance through which it regards the Soviet Union.
The United States public and private sectors need to devote more
effort to study of the Soviet Union. In addition, the history and recent
instances of Soviet deception against the United States, maintained
primarily by the US government, should be widely distributed, not just
to allied governments but also to the US public. The free public must
realize the magnitude of the Soviet deception effort. Only then will it
be possible to place in perspective Soviet involvement in past and
future world events.
Eventually, suspicion and hostility must be replaced with greater
understanding and trust by both parties or the United States and the
Soviet Union will not reach their full potential. Confidence and
investment in the democratic system of government must be demon-
strated by democratic policy makers. So must a less naive approach to
the USSR. In this period of potential change in the Soviet Union
100
towards openness about its past faults and present deficiencies, the
West must avoid automatic skepticism of everything Soviet. Deception
on the part of the Soviet Union against US interests should not be
believed in as an absolute for all future relations. Neither should con-
tinuing deception be ignored in the quest for better relations. The
West must stop seeing the hope of foreign policy moderation in Soviet
words when corresponding action is lacking. To tell the truth loudly
and clearly about Soviet manipulation is the first step in minimizing
the effects and utility of Soviet perceptions management.
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